In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPENDIUM VOLUME II - MIDDLE EAST (U)

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INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPENDIUM

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PREFACE

(C) Despite various and constantly increasing governmental attempts to counter terrorism, it has become a constant on the international scene. Of special interest to the Defense Intelligence Agency are certain groups which act transnationally, cultivate ties with counterparts,in other countries, and pose an actual or potential threat to US or allied interests and personnel.

(C) Intended to serve as a ready reference, this report is part of a continuing effort to comprehend international terrorism as it exists today in Western Europe, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia. The report consists of four regional volumes, published in a 6-month cycle.

(C) The Palestinians and Iran are covered in this report; the relevant groups are listed and described. Following an executive summary for each group, information is provided under the outline headings: orientation/goals; estimated strength; principal leaders, with biographic data when available; background (including contemporary history, splinters, front groups and domestic ties); tactics/methods of operation; organization; headquarters/bases; training; weapons; finances; international connections; event analysis; and significant activities--significant in terms of a group's development or its impact on international perceptions--with specifics provided for more complex operations.

(C) The limitations of a task of this kind are self-evident. Since groups are almost always clandestine, information gaps exist and some details of internal operations and external ties remain unknown. A few portraits are perforce incomplete.

(U) Addresses are requested to forward information which will supplement or correct this report. Questions and comments should be referred in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agency (ATTN: DN-2), Washington, D.C. 20301.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PALESTINIANS	1
Al Fatah/Black September Organization (BSO)	1
As-Sa'iqa (The Thunderbolt)	33
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)	39
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	49
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC)	67
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP)	75
Arab Liberation Front (ALF)	81
Popular Struggle Front (PSF)	87
Black June Organization (BJO) - (aka Fatah - The Revolutionary Council)	91



PALESTINIANS

Al Fatah/Black September Organization (BSO)

Executive Summary

(U) Representative of the moderate mainstream of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Fatah advocates the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip. After the November 1977 Sadat peace initiative and the September 1978 publication of the Camp David frameworks for peace, the group became more militant, unwilling either to have the destiny of the Palestinian people decided without their representation or to be bested by the militancy of other fedayeen groups.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) With 8,000 to 10,000 members, Fatah is about four times the size of the next largest Palestinian organization and dominates PLO fora. It has its own highly developed organizational pyramid, topped by an all-powerful Central Committee, meeting regularly with leftist and rightist members. Fatah's resources and facilities also outstrip other fedayeen groups. Its own extensive military and political training program has a broad curricula covering everything from military to commando to terrorist subjects. Fatah also has access to training by a variety of Arab and Warsaw Pact countries, including helicopter and fighter-plane pilot training, underwater instruction, security and intelligence. Fatah's arsenal, the most sophisticated in the Palestinian resistance movement, possesses a wide range of weaponry from symbolic Kalashnikov rifles and handgrenades to 155-mm towed field artillery, surface-to-air missiles and high-grade explosives. Reports in late 1978 indicated the possibility that Fatah soon might have access to transport aircraft and a small submarine.

(C/NOFORN) No international terrorist incidents have ever been perpetrated in Fatah's name. For that type of operation, in the early 1970s, the Black September Organization was used; and BSO has been dormant since 1975. Nowadays, Fatah concentrates on actions in Israel and the occupied territories. Since the Israeli incursion into south Lebanon in March 1978 cut most Palestinian access to northern Israel, Fatah has relied on seaborne infiltration. Its operations are aimed at holding hostages in exchange for fedayeen prisoners or at killing Israelis and their collaborators; and the death tolls have been high. More frequently, Fatah has been emphasizing its "legitimate armed struggle" and seeking to disrupt Israeli daily life. This is accomplished by numerous smaller bombing incidents directed at public places and accommodations--these actions also kill Israelis and their collaborators.

Al Fatah/Black September Organization (BSO)

Orientation/Goals:

(U) Al Fatah is the largest and most powerful fedayeen group in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). [The PLO is a political-legal umbrella, coordinating activities, mediating ideological conflicts, and functioning as a Palestinian government-in-exile (without using that label).] Fatah usually represents the moderate PLO position, seeking the creation of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip. In November 1977, however, a new Fatah militancy was provoked by the Sadat peace initiative. In December, the group joined in the Tripoli Summit of Steadfastness and Confrontation resolutions which vowed to grant no recognition, join no negotiations, and make no peace with Israel. At the same time, a separate Palestinian unity declaration seemed to reconcile Fatah with more radical Palestinian groups along rejectionist lines.

(U) During 1978, the Fatah Central Committee issued additional hard line statements, noting that "events have proved . . . (that) abrogating the option of force and fighting cannot lead to a just peace. Rather it will lead to submission . . . ." Following publication of the Camp David frameworks for peace, the Committee called on all Palestinians "to reject the proposed self-rule idea on the grounds that it consecrates Zionist occupation, to boycott any elections in the occupied territories because representatives chosen will represent the interests of imperialism, and to reject all forms of dealing with the Zionist enemy under the aegis of Camp David or under the influence of Sadat."

(U) While Fatah calls for Arab and Palestinian unity, it also strives to prevent the domination of the Palestinian resistance movement by any Arab state or by Palestinian leftists. Pragmatic nationalism is its preeminent governing principle.

(U) When it undertook international terrorist exploits, Fatah maintained the guise of moderation by using the covert Black September Organization (BSO). Although Fatah conducts and claims responsibility for operations in Israel and the occupied territories as a legitimate part of its armed struggle, and engaged in acts of revenge against Iraq, no other international incidents have been perpetrated in its name on foreign soil. Since Camp David, several Fatah leaders have voiced threats against US interests in the Middle East; none have been fulfilled.

Estimated strength:

(U) 8,000 to 10,000.

(U) BSO: 300, at height of activity in 1972-73.

Principal leaders:

(U) Yasir Arafat (Abu Amar). Born 1929 in Jerusalem.

(U) A member of the Husayni clan and a distant relative of the late Grand Mufti, Arafat was involved in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. His family became refugees in Gaza and he studied at the University of Cairo where he became president of the Palestinian Students Federation. When Egyptian President Nasser sought control over inchoate fedayeen raids from Gaza into Israel, Arafat was imprisoned. He was released in time to serve with the Egyptian Army during the S War of 1956.

(U) Arafat moved to Kuwait and, with a small group of Palestinian refugees, founded Fatah with secret cells based on the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). In 1964, he quit all other jobs to devote himself totally to the Palestinian cause; he has no personal life. Arafat has been involved in the planning and direction of many Fatah guerrilla operations since they began on 1 January 1965. Due to Fatah's armed struggle and his leadership of this strong activist core, Arafat was able to achieve preeminent control over the then-languishing PLO in February 1969.

(C/NOFORN) Arafat is a survivor. Because of his diplomatic and political adeptness, he has endured as the leader of the Palestinian resistance. Ostensibly, the only criterion determining his foreign policy toward other nations is their attitudes toward the Palestinian revolution. He is essentially a nonideological pragmatist or opportunist, seeking to facilitate good relations with all Arab countries, whether conservative or progressive, in order to accrue the benefits of financial, moral, diplomatic and arms support necessary to advance the national cause. Arafat's desire not to antagonize needed Arab allies has been accompanied by independent actions, upsetting to his cohorts. Seeking to insure that the Palestinians would not be excluded from the peace process and its results, and to counter possible Syrian domination of the resistance movement and of his actions, Arafat was exceedingly restrained in his actions and rhetoric toward Sadat and Egypt long after many others in the movement and in the Arab world had adopted more vituperative stands. He would not sign the Palestinian unity declaration at Tripoli, explaining that, as head of the PLO, he is "above" groups; more likely his refusal was because of the document's truculent tone toward Sadat's efforts.

(C/NOFORN) Arafat's relations with Syria are equally the subject of real politik. In the early stages of the 1975-76 war in Lebanon, when Syria sided with the Christian right against the Muslim left and its Palestinian allies, Arafat and Syrian President Asad seemingly were irreconcilable enemies. As a realinement developed, however, Arafat attempted to keep the resistance movement out of Christian/Syrian confrontation and banded together with Syria in

opposition to Iraq and the rejectionist groups it supports. As Arafat's and Asad's interests coincide, they help perpetuate Arafat's "moderate" dominance of the PLO.

(U) Arafat's journey to Jordan with Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi in September 1978 produced an uproar from other, unconsulted Palestinian groups and Fatah colleagues. They were incensed because they had been given no advance notice of a visit to King Hussein, the man responsible for expelling thousands of Palestinian guerrillas in 1970-71. Arafat's unilateral revitalization of Palestinian-Jordanian relations remains a continuing subject of intra-Palestinian dispute.

(S/NOFORN) In 1978, Arafat's utilitarian maneuvers in the several aftermaths of the war in Lebanon produced intense opposition from his more extreme comrades and created the severest political survival test he had ever faced. For the first time, Arafat ordered punitive military action against dissidents within Fatah's own ranks. Subsequently, Fatah launched terrorist operations against Iraq because of its support for Sabri al Banna's Black June Organization which had attacked Fatah moderates and instigated Fatah leftists. Thus, Arafat, the premier advocate of Palestinian and Arab unity, fought against Palestinians and Arabs for his supremacy of Fatah and the overall Palestinian movement. The leadership position long occupied because of his political skills was retained by virtue of his readiness to deploy force against weaker opponents.

(U) Also in 1978, the PLO decisionmaking process was criticized by leaders of other Palestinian groups who prefer a more collegial, "democratic" process. Although Arafat was not mentioned by name, his imposition of moderation in Lebanon and his equally "dictatorial" disciplinary actions within Fatah were the obvious targets of this attack. Arafat, who believes that he is the embodiment of the Palestinian revolution, can ignore critics whose resources render their opposition rhetorical.

(U) Constantly on the move, Arafat sometimes seems to travel to take attention away from prevailing domestic Palestinian problems. The wide recognition accorded the PLO is a tribute to his efforts and public relations skills. Arafat's speech and reception at the United Nations General Assembly in November 1974 was his greatest international success. He has traveled to the Soviet Union many times, usually as head of a PLO delegation. In April 1977, he had his first public meeting with Soviet Communist Party Chief Brezhnev. In May 1978, Arafat visited the Soviet Union as leader of Fatah. In all, he journeyed to Moscow three times in 1978.

(U) Arafat does not condone international terrorism because it interferes with diplomatic efforts to further the Palestinian cause. His image was only temporarily sullied by his rumored presence in a Fatah communications post at the time of the BSO Khartoum murders in March 1973. Arafat insists,

however, that Fatah actions against Israel and the occupied territories are part of the legitimate Palestinian armed struggle and recently suggested that guerrillas will hit US interests in the Middle East if the Palestinians are forced to accept the autonomy plan for the West Bank and Gaza. He assured a US Congressman that if a Palestinian state was created on the limited territory, it would renounce all violent means to enlarge its domain and, thereby, grant de facto recognition to Israel. In character, Arafat's observations about possible Palestinian national actions were not cleared with his compatriots.

(U) As Chairman of the Central Committee of Fatah, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, and Commander in Chief of the Palestine Revolution Forces, Arafat is the most powerful Palestinian leader.

(U) Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad). Born 1933 in Jaffa.

(U) Khalaf left Israel for Gaza in 1948. He subsequently attended the University of Cairo where he met Arafat and became his assistant in the Palestinian Students Federation. Khalaf is a founding member of Fatah and aided in the formation of its first secret cells. He worked in Kuwait until 1967 when he began full-time Fatah activism. In September 1970, Khalaf was arrested in Jordan; intervention by Egyptian President Nasser prevented his execution.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Frequently called the second most powerful man in Fatah, Khalaf definitely is in the organization's top echelon and probably was the primary leader of the now dormant Black September Organization (BSO). He favored international terrorism because there was no opportunity to fight at home. Khalaf's name was linked with the Munich Olympics operation in September 1972, the plot to overthrow King Hussein of Jordan in November 1972, the abortive assassination scheme at the Rabat Arab Summit of October 1974, and the seizure of the Egyptian Embassy in Madrid in September 1975. Rumors of imminent BSO international terrorism still abound whenever one of Khalaf's trusted lieutenants is reported to be traveling.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Khalaf launched the Rabat operation independently, allegedly because the Fatah Central Committee excluded him from any PLO role during the previous 6 months and because Arafat ordered the BSO to cease operations in September 1974. Some Arab governments, concerned about Khalaf's leftist reputation, reportedly insisted these actions be taken. By the Rabat operation, Khalaf intended to prove that he was still a power to be dealt with in the Palestinian movement. After the plot aborted and following several weeks of discreet nonappearance, Khalaf reemerged at center stage with a more prominent and frequent role in Fatah PLO matters.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In his relations with the Arab states and Palestinian groups, Khalaf is as independent and flexible as Arafat. He was the first Palestinian figure to establish contact with Libyan leader Qadhafi,

from whom he obtained separate funds and weapons. When estranged from Qadhafi, Khalaf may have developed some ties to elements in the Egyptian leadership. Then he shifted his alinement to Syria: he played a crucial role in negotiations with Syria on Lebanon, supported Syrian opposition to the Sadat initiative and demanded the overthrow of the Egyptian President.

(U) A comparable pattern of behavior is evinced in the Palestinian arena, especially during the spring 1978 internal Fatah disputes. Initially, in April, Khalaf opposed cooperation with the United Nations Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) who were seeking to facilitate the Israeli withdrawal. He seemed to support the Fatah leftists who wanted to attack the Israelis while they were withdrawing. When the leftists were effectively countered by Arafat and his allies, Khalaf facilely shifted his position to conform to the dominant moderates, blaming "Iraqi subversion" for Fatah's troubles and temporarily absenting himself from Lebanon until the storm passed.

(U) Recently, Khalaf has undertaken a mediating role in Lebanon. He met with the prime minister and instigated meetings between PLO representatives and Lebanese rightists, to the dismay of Palestinian radicals. Khalaf stated that both the Lebanese and the Palestinians had been duped into the crisis in Lebanon and that the war had been engineered by the United States to crush the PLO.

(U) Khalaf's willingness to enunciate thoughts and act in ways that the more "diplomatic" or "political" Arafat cannot or will not has been exploited by Arafat. At the Tripoli Summit in December 1977, it was Khalaf who affixed his signature to the official documents for Fatah in lieu of Arafat who thereby avoided complete identification with rejectionism. Because Khalaf has his own power base among Fatah militants and has had independent resources placed at his disposal, however, Arafat does try to keep a rein on his activities.

(U) Khalaf's memoirs, Palestinian Without a Homeland, were published in February 1978.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Khalaf is head of the PLO's United Security Office and a member of the Fatah Central Committee.

(U) Khalil Ibrahim al Wazir (Abu Jihad). Born in 1931 or 1941 in Gaza (?).

(S/NOFORN) Married to Arafat's sister and one of the original founders of Fatah, Wazir is a quiet man who usually shuns publicity. He received military training in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and was a colonel in the Palestine Liberation Army. He has been a member of almost every Fatah delegation to China and has visited other Asian Communist countries. Wazir led a high-powered PLO delegation to the PRC in July 1975 to strengthen ties and obtain weapons and other support.

(S/NOFORN) In addition to his close personal ties to Arafat, Wazir's importance in Fatah is due in large measure to his military and operational roles. At one time, he was in charge of all arms and materiel acquisitions for Fatah. Reportedly, he was one of the major BSO leaders in 1972-73. Now, he is a member of the Fatah Central Committee, head of Fatah's Western Affairs Office, which oversees operations into Israel and the occupied territories, and commander of Al Asifah, Fatah's military force. Wazir personally planned and supervised training for the March 1975 Savoy Hotel operation in Tel Aviv and the March 1978 Tel Aviv-Haifa Road terrorism.

(U) Loyal to Arafat and apparently supportive of the Fatah chairman's moderation, Wazir deployed Al Asifah forces to suppress Fatah dissidents in April 1978 and was responsible for attempts to establish Palestinian rightist hegemony in southern Lebanon later in the year.

(U) Wazir narrowly escaped death on 10 October 1978 when an electronically detonated bomb exploded alongside a road on which he was traveling in south Lebanon and shattered his car windscreen.

(S/NOFORN) Because his power base is an intrinsic part of the Fatah organizational structure, Wazir is widely regarded as the second most powerful man in Fatah and a potent rival of Khalaf.

Background:

(U) Formed by Palestinian exiles in Kuwait in the early 1950s, Fatah surfaced in 1959 and began to mount regular commando raids into Israel on 1 January 1965. After the 1967 Six-Day War, Fatah grew rapidly and eclipsed other fedayeen organizations. In 1969, Fatah leader Yasir Arafat assumed the PLO chairmanship.

(U) Reprisal raids by Israel had led to the 1968 landmark battle at Karamah where Fatah fought the Israelis for 3 days with Jordanian Army support. By 1970, however, as a result of terrorist operations culminating in Jordan, the Jordanians viewed the Palestinian presence as a threat to their regime. In the summers of 1970 (Black September) and 1971, all Palestinian guerrilla organizations were forcibly expelled from Jordan. Most offices and activities moved to Lebanon.

(U) Increasingly limited possibilities for action against Israel from neighboring Arab states prompted Fatah's resorting to international terrorism in November 1971 with the BSO assassination of the Jordanian Prime Minister.

(U) After the October 1973 Middle East War, Fatah modified its immediate goals and seemed to abandon the idea that the entire, indivisible territory of the former British Palestine Mandate could be liberated by armed struggle as set forth in the Palestine National Charter. Under Fatah's leadership, the

PLO issued a working paper expressing limited territorial goals and a conditional willingness to attend the Geneva Peace Conference. [Those fedayeen groups which rejected the 1974 PLO/Fatah plan formed the Rejection Front.]

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Also after the war, Fatah's military efforts against Israel were confined to cross-border operations from staging sites in Lebanon. And Lebanon bore the brunt of Israeli retaliations. Previous Palestinian-Lebanese discord over similar actions had been pacified by the Cairo Agreement of 1969 and the Melkart Protocol of 1973. These accords intended to regulate the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, but they also contained a Lebanese agreement to facilitate commando operations by providing access to the border area. In practice, therefore, the Palestinians contend that the Cairo Agreement legitimizes their right to remain in southern Lebanon. Consequently, trouble reoccurred because the Palestinian presence in Lebanon endangered the tenuously balanced sectarian political system and finally was a cause of a war in April 1975. Fatah participated on the side of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM-Muslim, leftist), armed and trained LNM militias, and commanded and fought alongside some of them. Fatah security forces abetted (instigated?) the Beirut garrison commander's "coup by television" in March 1976. In June 1976, Syria entered the melee on the Christian, rightist side. The Palestinians fought for their last front bordering their homeland. In October 1976, the Riyadh Arab Summit sanctioned Syria's role while preventing Syrian domination of Lebanon and the Palestinian movement. Nonetheless, the Palestinians were forced to conform to Syrian (Arab) imperatives.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Despite the cease-fire and the presence of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) in Lebanon, intermittent skirmishes occurred. Sometimes Fatah acted to prevent rejectionist incendiarism and a reescalation of the war. At other times, Fatah joined rejectionists in battles against Sa'iqa and the Syrian-dominated ADF to preserve Palestinian unity and inviolability. As the war dragged on, conflicts between the Israeli-assisted Lebanese Christians and either the Syrians/ADF or the Palestinians became more frequent and Fatah's actions were less distinct from the rest of the resistance movement.

(U) In July 1977, the Shtawrah Agreement was conceived to pacify the situation by establishing a timetable for the implementation of the 1969 Cairo accord and to attempt to regulate the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, again. The plan primarily called for Palestinian withdrawal from the central and western sectors of southern Lebanon and the creation of a buffer zone along the Israeli border to be patrolled by the Lebanese Army. By November, however, it was obvious that Shtawrah was not working. The debilitated Lebanese Army was unable to play its role in the south and the Palestinians refused to pull out completely and leave a vacuum on the front. Furthermore, by that time, due to the Sadat initiative, Syria was unwilling to force total Palestinian compliance. An impasse marked by intermittent violence prevailed until March 1978.

(U) With the Sadat initiative began a series of developments affecting the position of the Palestinians in Lebanon, the internal unity of Fatah, and Fatah's relations with other Palestinian groups and with various Arab states, notably Iraq. To protest the peace process, the Black June Organization (BJO) assassinated Yusuf as Siba'i, editor of Al Ahram and close personal friend of Egyptian President Sadat, took hostages, and hijacked a plane in Nicosia, Cyprus, in February 1978.

(U) Unwilling to be surpassed by more active opponents of the peace process, Fatah launched the Tel Aviv-Haifa Road operation in March 1978. In retaliation, the Israeli Defense Forces swept into Lebanon to clean out guerrilla bases and strongholds south of the Litani River. In expectation of the invasion, the Palestinians had initiated an orderly withdrawal of forces and, from strategic locations, were able to impede the Israeli advance. The Palestinians delayed the Israelis longer than Egypt had in 1956 and longer than the combined Arab forces had in 1967. Palestinian losses reportedly were about half of what were expected and, therefore, tolerable. In their own terms, the Palestinians were generally triumphant.

(C/NOFORN) The Israeli onslaught prompted the creation of UNIFIL to be situated between the Palestinians and the Israeli border. Arafat pledged PLO support for UNIFIL's efforts to facilitate the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. The Palestinians insisted, however, that nothing in the UN resolution or UNIFIL's mandate could contravene the Cairo accord; they would not give up the right to return to the south. But the Palestinians disagreed among themselves about when that return would take place. Fatah leftists and rejectionist groups clamored for action against the withdrawing Israelis and sought to discredit Arafat's cooperation with UNIFIL by attacking the UN forces.

(U) A hint of Arafat's determination to take forceful action against opponents was almost unnoticed in the week before the Israeli invasion. Colonel 'Ali Salim Hamad (Abu Sa'id), head of the splinter Fatah ath Thawra (Revolutionary Fatah), accused of attempting to assassinate Arafat and of hijacking an Arab airliner in 1977, fell victim to a mysterious ambush. Compared to others, Abu Sa'id was only a minor annoyance to Fatah moderates.

(U) Stronger opposition remained. During the war in Lebanon, Fatah commanders had been given independent power over their military units. One Fatah leftist Muhammad Da'ud Awdah (Abu Da'ud), sought to defy Arafat's decisions concerning UNIFIL and south Lebanon and to carry out operations behind Israeli lines. He gathered a group of about 120 followers, many from the BJO, and prepared to attack the Israelis. Arafat issued orders for their arrest and a battle ensued. Da'ud and his ally Naji Allush were vocally supported by Muhammad Salih (Abu Salih), Majid abu Sharara and, only initially, Salah Khalaf. Arafat was supported by Khalil al Wazir and Ha'il abd al Hamid. Wazir commanded the attack on Da'ud's men. After a furious spate of internal

diplomacy and heated marathon Fatah meetings, the 3 May Central Committee political statement was issued, glossing over differences by deferring to the militants. Most arrestees were released.

(U) But Arafat continued his pursuit of discipline in Fatah and in the Palestinian resistance movement. In May 1978, he attempted to unseat subordinate military commanders allied with Salih and Khalaf. Independent military commands were removed by handing over responsibility for all decisions concerning the military situation in Lebanon to Wazir. In June, Arafat convened an extraordinary revolutionary tribunal which, on the same day, ordered the execution of two Palestinians allegedly involved in protection rackets. Abu Da'ud condemned the executions and claimed that the two "martyrs" were among those arrested in April.

(U) Observing Fatah's internecine disputes, the Rejection Front and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) issued a joint statement condemning the attack on Da'ud's forces and military confrontations between Palestinian groups or within a single organization because they only aid the enemy. These same factions also objected to Arafat's decisions on south Lebanon and proposed that the general secretaries of all groups and representatives of the Fatah Central Committee and other nationalist elements form the leadership of the Palestinian revolution. Arafat, however, counterproposed that a People's Army with a central command be established in Lebanon to assert discipline over the various components of the resistance movement.

(U) Arafat's confrontations were not only with Fatah and other Palestinian rejectionists but with the regime that supported them--Iraq. After 1976, when Iraq objected to the Riyadh Summit's attempt to impose peace in Lebanon, he did not visit Baghdad. The Iraqis reject any hint of peace with Israel and want continued warfare against the Jewish State from Lebanon, whatever the price. They were particularly suspicious of Arafat's modus vivendi with Syrian President Asad and his rival Ba'th regime. /In autumn 1976, Iraq began using the BJO to wage surrogate warfare against Syria. In 1978, Fatah/PLO emissaries and overseas offices became targets for terrorist operations supported by Iraq. A string of actions began with the assassination of PLO moderate Sa'id Hammami in London in January 1978. Fatah and the PLO kept silent about the Iraqi connection until the June 1978 assassination of the head of the PLO office in Kuwait. In July, the PLO Executive Committee sent a memorandum to the Iraqi Government calling for it to hand over BJO leader Al Banna and close his inflammatory radio station. The PLO was "desirous that Iraq remain a base for the Palestinian struggle and not a base to destroy the Palestinian struggle."

(U) Less restrained, Fatah threatened retaliation in kind for Iraqi-supported sabotage and murder. In July and August, Fatah conducted a series of terrorist operations against Iraq in countries from England to Pakistan. Simultaneously, Fatah clashed with various Iraqi-sponsored rejectionist groups, including the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), the Popular Struggle Front

(PSF), and the Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP), in Lebanon. Fatah even attacked rejectionist offices in Libya.

(U) Representing Algerian leader Boumedienne, the Algerian Ambassador to Lebanon mediated the feud. Arafat agreed to halt the propaganda campaign, halt all acts of terrorism and attacks on rejectionist organizations in Lebanon and abroad, and hold a direct PLO-Iraq dialog. Moved by a devastating explosion at a joint Palestinian headquarters in Beirut in mid-August, Fatah delegates and representatives of all other fedayeen groups held bilateral meetings. Reconciliations were accelerated by the Camp David accords in September when the need to build a united Arab front to oppose Egyptian-Israeli peace took precedence over any disputes. Throughout the fall, Palestinian leaders met for unity discussions and a Syrian-Iraqi-Palestinian understanding emerged from a series of confrontation summits. The only discordant note was sounded by the DFLP's violent opposition to the Jordanian overture in November.

(U) The Palestine National Council (PNC) session in January 1979 was meant to "augur in a jamboree of unity" but seemed more like a struggle for power. For the first time, Fatah attended and emerged from a PNC session without at least one other Palestinian faction as an ally. All others united in their opposition to Fatah's continued domination of the PLO. The readmission of rejectionist groups, especially the PFLP, to the Executive Committee (EC) was a primary goal of the session. Fatah, however, would not accept any restructuring formula that would dilute its strength on the committee and demanded that the addition of rejectionist representatives be offset by an increase in its own EC members. The other groups adamantly refused. In the end, the EC retained its pre-PNC composition, implicitly favoring Fatah. Another result beneficial to Fatah concerned the disposition of funds granted by the confrontation summits. Fatah desired distribution through PLO institutions it controls. The other wanted funds allocated on a group quota basis. The EC will decide a compromise between institutions and organizations; and Fatah still dominates the EC.

(U) The PNC approved Arafat's overture to Jordan, contingent upon King Hussein abiding by Baghdad Summit recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of Palestinians inside and outside the occupied territories. Fatah argues that the dialog with Jordan is necessary in order to keep Jordan out of the peace process--diplomacy for the sake of diplomacy. Other fedayeen factions demand more concrete results in the form of bases, offices and recruitment rights in Jordan and perceive mere political accomplishments as a surrender to Jordan. Palestinian-Jordanian relations are still controversial in Palestinian circles.

(U) Overall, for the Palestinians and for Fatah, a positive assessment of the PNC session may be possible. As a conclave of all the previously warring Palestinian groups, the PNC meetings did set the stage for further unity efforts and discussions. As of mid-February 1979, the threat of a Middle East peace advanced intra-Palestinian pacification.

(C/NOFORN) For Fatah itself, thoughts of peace may provoke thoughts of international terrorism. In November 1978, the BSO reportedly had been tasked to revitalize its cells in Europe. Inadequacy of available information, however, inhibits conclusions about the magnitude of current terrorist threats from this source.

Tactics/Methods of operation:

(C) Fatah concentrates primarily on actions in Israel and the occupied territories by infiltrating small teams overland and, with increasing frequency, via the sea. Their primary missions often are to take hostages to exchange for fedayeen prisoners in Israeli jails and to kill Israelis. Fatah's few dramatic assaults in Israel help sustain its preeminent position among guerrilla groups who recognize and respect the greater danger involved in confronting the enemy on enemy soil than in indulging in attacks on more accessible international soil. More common than dramatic, infiltrators and terrorists from the occupied territories also target collaborating Arabs and institutions linked to Israeli authority, such as labor exchanges and vehicles transporting Palestinian workers. Bombings and rocket attacks are especially favored, safer operations with crowded market areas being most vulnerable to the former and northern Israeli border settlements subject to the latter. In late 1978, the number of terrorist strikes against Israeli settlements on the West Bank rose. Fatah always claims that its Israeli targets are military ones, even when civilians are the victims.

(U) Fatah is believed responsible for most incidents perpetrated in Israel and the occupied territories and claimed in the general name of the PLO.

(C) Although the Black September Organization has been dormant for several years, reports of possible resumption of operations are still received. In its heyday, the BSO favored dramatic exploits, combining different types of activities such as assassinations, hijackings, taking hostages, and sabotage. Preferred targets were Israeli officials or agents abroad, Jewish businesses, Western companies or installations, and Jordanians. BSO missions were planned carefully and manpower was selected from the educated, frequently multilingual, ranks of various guerrilla groups or from sympathizers. Those chosen received special training and forged documents, usually departed from Beirut, and took convoluted itineraries to reach prescribed destinations. They may not have known their ultimate goal or even that they were, for individual missions, BSO operatives. Only on arrival were they briefed on plans and given weapons.

(U) Observers of terrorism commented that Fatah's anti-Iraq campaign in the summer of 1978 lacked the sophistication associated with BSO plans.

Organization

(C) The Central Committee, with 11 members playing functional roles and chaired by Arafat, meets weekly and tops the pyramidal structure of Fatah, governing regional committees in every Palestinian refugee area. The 120?-member Revolutionary Council is a powerful intermediary body, controlling spending and supervising the effectiveness of Fatah administrative agencies. It convenes about every 3 months. The larger General Council is a parliamentary forum which meets infrequently. Each region is a self-contained unit with its own political and military bureaus and information center. At the base of the pyramid are cells, located in each refugee camp, university with Palestinian students, and factory with Palestinian workers. Al Asifah is Fatah's military arm and includes the Yarmuk Brigade, divided into battalions and companies, and Al Qastal and Karamah forces, also subdivided into operating units.

(S/NOFORN) Office 17 is Arafat's own security organization, tasked with insuring the safety of high-ranking Fatah personalities. Arafat is believed to use Office 17 as an internal intelligence apparatus and, perhaps, as an elite strike force against political opponents.

(C) BSO elements generally formed cells of five men each; four for executing operations and the fifth as a connecting link to other secret cells. Only the leader knew and contacted other cell leaders. Depending on the circumstances, cells might have been smaller or larger. In 1974 and 1975, cells or teams with as many as 15 members were involved in actions.

Headquarters/Bases:

(U) Fatah is headquartered in western Beirut. United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria are controlled by fedayeen and are used extensively for offices and training.

(U) The 100-square-mile 'Urqub region in southeast Lebanon is known as Fatahland. The primary aim of the March 1978 Israeli invasion was to clear guerrillas out of this and other border areas and to establish a Lebanese Christian security belt adjacent to the Israeli border. The Israelis succeeded in shoving the center of guerrilla activity northward to the area between the Zahrani and Litani Rivers. South of the Litani, the Palestinians retained only their enclave at Tyre. Controlled by Fatah, the port of Tyre is the main arms receiving point for fedayeen in Lebanon.

(C/NOFORN) At a more or less constant level of activity for the past 11 months, Fatah and other Palestinian militias have been attempting to reestablish themselves in the south. The effort began with the repopulation of the Rashidiyah, Burj ash Shamali and Al Buss refugee camps surrounding Tyre. The Israelis say that Rashayya al Fukhkhar in the east and Qana and Siddiqin in

the west are the main areas of renewed guerrilla activity. As noted, the Palestinians insist that the Cairo accord assures their right of access to the border region; their cooperation with UNIFIL has merely restrained exercise of that right.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The Israeli action in March 1978 did not affect many Fatah and Palestinian bases, training sites, command posts, magazines and offices in other parts of Lebanon. In fact, they may have been strengthened to compensate for losses in the south. The Palestinians have hard-surface airfields and other facilities at Ad Damur and Nabatiyah. The latter is a major headquarters site and concentration where the number of personnel and rockets was increased in early 1979. In late 1978, artillery emplacements were augmented at Arnun and Hammadiyah.

(C) Fatah military forces may be based at Al Baddawi, Ad Dalhamiyah, Burj ash Shamali, As Saqy and At Tayyiba, among other sites. Al Qasimiyah, Al Athai'i (as received), Nahr al Barid, Al Aqbiyah, Adlun and Sarafand are naval bases or facilities.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Since the October 1973 War, the Syrian Government has enforced sometimes severe restrictions on all Palestinian activity in Syria. Control was tightened after the 1975 Syrian-Israeli disengagement accord, during the war in Lebanon, due to the 1976-77 Syrian-Jordanian rapprochement, and as political pressure before the 1977 Palestine National Council session. Within these restrictions, Fatah was usually able to maintain offices, logistics bases, training areas, intelligence interrogation sites and magazines at approved locations away from cease-fire lines and the Jordanian border. At times, some offices and training facilities were closed, some Fatah officers were arrested, and cadre were banned from carrying arms. At no time, however, did Fatah operations in Syria cease completely. Fatah offices remained open in Damascus and Fatah's military school at Al Ghutah graduated an officers class.

(C/NOFORN) The reins on Palestinians in Syria were eased after the Sadat initiative and this trend continued throughout 1978. Arms depots and warehouses were returned to Fatah control and, the Israelis report, two to three Palestinian bases were set up in southern Syria near the Jordanian border. The Palestinian radio station which had been closed in Cairo found a new home in Damascus.

(C/NOFORN) After the March 1978 Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, Syria permitted increased infiltration into Jordan and stopped sharing intelligence concerning Palestinian guerrilla activity with Jordanian authorities. King Hussein refuses to allow Palestinian bases to be set up on Jordanian territory and security there is tight.

(C) Supportive of the Iranian revolution, Fatah may be training Iranians (affiliation unknown) in safehouses at Sitt Zaneb/Zayn (as received) in Syria and at Burj ash Shamali in Lebanon.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Fatah's situation in Libya has also been subject to cyclical changes. In May 1977, the tide turned against Fatah when the Libyan regime, which favors the Rejectionist Front, transferred two military camps to the PFLP. Fatah retained tenuous control over two other bases: one in Tripoli and the other near Benghazi.

(C) Following the Fatah attack on a Black June Organization office in Tripoli in July 1978, the Libyan Government merged all Palestinian resistance group activities in Libya with the PLO office, signaling a victory for Fatah which controls that office and a possible improvement in Fatah's situation in Libya.

(C/NOFORN) Fatah has active cells on the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Some discovered cells appear to use sophisticated methods of operation and weaponry. Some have arms-manufacturing capabilities.

(S) Al Asifah reportedly operated an occupied territories apparatus from Kuwait.

(C/NOFORN) In November 1978, the BSO may have been tasked to maintain cells in Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and West Germany.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) BSO has had a base on Cyprus since the early 1970s. Various Palestinian groups use the island as a logistics base and springboard for operations against Israel. Fatah is the most active and has sent equipment, weapons, food, and manpower to Lebanon from Cyprus; it reportedly has arms stores in Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaca and Limassol. Fatah tries to impede similar Lebanese Christian activity on the island.

(C/NOFORN) Reports of possible fedayeen training sites on Cyprus have never been confirmed.

Training:

(U) Fatah offers general courses in basic military skills and commando training as well as specialized terrorist training for saboteurs, assassins and kidnapers. Curricula also provide political indoctrination. This combined political/military framework is carried over into camps for boys between the ages of 10 and 14 who are called Ashbal or lion cubs.

(C) The largest training effort is in Lebanon. Military cadres learn about fitness, military organization, night marches, guard posting and challenging, digging tunnels and ditches, survival training, and weapons familiarization, including heavy weapons and artillery use. Terrorists attached to Khalil al Wazir, who oversees operations into Israel and the occupied territories, learn weapons use, swimming, boat handling, and compass and map reading, as well as self-reliance.

(C) After the Camp David frameworks were published, the Fatah Central Committee decided to train 1,000 special commandos. In November 1978, select groups were sent abroad for instruction: 20 to the Soviet Union, 30 to China, 30 to Cuba, 30 to Vietnam and, except for 100 assigned to a program at Ad Damur, Lebanon, the rest went to Algeria and Iraq.

(C) Although Fatah relies to a great extent on training from friendly nations, it purchased its own military college in the Damascus Valley in 1973 with the aim of becoming increasingly self-sufficient in this field.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Several years ago, a Syrian base offered a chemical and biological warfare course in addition to instruction in the use of mortars, antitank missiles and ground-to-air missiles. Other bases offered small arms training. No further reports have been received on the scientific programs, but the purely military ones are probably conducted today.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In Libya, fedayeen learned infantry tactics, communications, antiaircraft artillery use, hand-to-hand combat, transportation methods, parachuting and frogmen techniques and received special instruction in the use of SA-7 (Strela/Grail) missiles. In April 1977, Fatah members were still receiving helicopter and fighter pilot training and underwater instruction in Libya.

(C/NOFORN) Fatah pilots are able to fly MiG-17, 19 and 21 aircraft as well as Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters.

(U) In the spring of 1978, the Palestinian resistance movement sent university graduate volunteers to Libya for aviation training. Several years ago, Fatah elements attended a similar course in Algeria.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Before the war in Lebanon, Soviet experts offered training in the use of air defense weapons at various refugee camps.

(C) Many local commanders in Lebanon are routinely sent to the Soviet Union for an average of 6 months' training and are replaced by recently returned personnel. In August 1978, 32 pilots and 60 maintenance engineers reportedly completed training courses in the Soviet Union, East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

(U) Other Palestinian pilots trained in Uganda.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In July 1978, the PLO and East Germany concluded an extensive military and political cooperation agreement; one provision called for the training of cadres.

(S/NOFORN) Yugoslavia offered a 6-month helicopter pilot training course in 1976. In June of that year, North Korea was training 180 fedayeen in

guerrilla tactics in the Pyongyang area. Fatah pilots are also trained on MiG fighter planes in China. Romania, which deals exclusively with the PLO, offers administrative courses.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Under the guise of civilian university students, Palestinians receive general military education in Pakistan. Fedayeen pilots are trained by the Pakistan Air Force. In the summer of 1978, Fatah sponsored 15 cadets for training with the Pakistan Navy; their specialties were to include small patrol gunboats, larger ships, and naval communications.

(U) A small number of Palestinian pilots are trained in Cuba. Reports of extensive use of Cuban instructors in Lebanon were never corroborated.

(U) Israeli sources allege that Egypt continued to train Fatah frogmen at a naval base in Alexandria as late as December 1978.

Weapons:

(C/NOFORN) Fatah relies mainly on Soviet and East European arms which include F-1 handgrenades, Tokarev 7.62-mm automatic pistols, AK-47 Kalashnikov rifles, 7.62-mm Goryunov machineguns, 12.7-mm Degtyarev-Shpagin and 14.5-mm Vladimirov heavy machineguns, 23-mm ZU-23 and other antiaircraft guns, 60-mm, 81-mm, 82-mm and 120-mm mortars, 122-mm howitzers, 73-mm recoilless rifles, 3.5-mm, 75-mm and 106-mm antitank rocket launchers, field guns, 105-mm, 122-mm, 130-mm and 155-mm towed field artillery, "Katyusha" and Grad 102-mm multiround rocket launchers, SA-7 missile launchers--and ammunition for all.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In February 1978, it was reported that Fatah had recently acquired Soviet surface-to-air missiles having 4.5-, 7.5- and 17.5-kilometer ranges. Allegedly, Fatah is the only Palestinian organization which has missiles and howitzers.

(C/NOFORN) In December 1978, as yet uncorroborated sources stated that the Soviets were preparing to give the PLO two Antonov medium cargo transport aircraft, resembling the Transall C-160, to base in South Yemen and use for training purposes.

(C/NOFORN) Palestinian and Fatah arms are funneled through various Arab countries. Supply efforts after the Steadfastness summits and the Israeli takeover of southern Lebanon primarily involved Libya and Syria. Ships from Libya transited via Cyprus and landed at Tyre where Fatah controlled the receipt of all shipments and distributed arms to other factions. In addition to donating rockets, rifles and explosives, Syria controlled the delivery of arms to Palestinians in Lebanon from Arabian Peninsula countries and Iraq. Although Iraq complained that Syrian restrictions on the passage of arms were too tight, truck convoys with assorted Iraqi weaponry did cross into Lebanon.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Libya supplies armored personnel carriers, land-rovers, trucks, machineguns, recoilless rifles and ammunition. It also provided Fatah with a powerful wireless transceiver and base station set. Salah Khalaf received his own shipment of mortars, machineguns and ammunition from Libya during the Lebanese conflict.

(U) Fatah received British-made rifles from Libya which also arranged the purchase of US Smith and Wesson revolvers for Palestinian leaders. Sometime in 1979, the Palestinians are expecting to deploy a small, Libyan-donated submarine in the Mediterranean.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Some 155-mm Fatah guns are of French manufacture.

(U) Fatah claims to produce RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers and has a plentiful supply.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Polish experts supervised construction of a plant for the manufacture of RPG-7 guns and shells at the Burj ash Shamali refugee camp and were to train Fatah personnel in the manufacture of the arms for 1 year, beginning in 1977. Another underground munitions plant, located in Rashidiyah camp, was expected to begin producing in September 1977. No status reports have been received about these operations which may have been affected by the Israeli invasion in March 1978.

(U) American M-16 rifles have been observed in fedayeen hands. The Israelis assert that the Tel Aviv-Haifa Road terrorists used US weapons bearing Saudi Arabian Army markings, including M-16s, light antitank guns and explosives.

(C) In January 1978, Saudi Arabia shipped 150 Toyota jeeps to Fatah. These arms and vehicles denoted a change in Saudi aid: previously, the Saudis gave only money and diplomatic support.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) In September 1973, Fatah naval bases in Lebanon reportedly had at least five speedboats equipped with multitube surface-to-surface rocket launchers capable of firing 140-mm rockets.

(U) Fatah terrorists used French-made Zodiac dinghies to gain access to Israeli beaches.

(U) Terrorists operating in Israel and the occupied territories carry Kalashnikov rifles, bazookas, handgrenades, detonators, rockets, mines and bombs. Some bombs are manufactured in underground cells in the occupied lands. In early 1979, devices used on the West Bank, especially in and around Jerusalem, were made with Symtex, a high-grade, efficient, Czechoslovakian explosive and RDX, another sophisticated explosive, both more powerful than previously relied upon explosives.

(U) The US State Department confirmed that China and North Korea are providing arms to the fedayeen. The Chinese shipped light arms during the war in Lebanon and after the Israeli invasion. Unclassified sources noted that China would deliver surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 25 kilometers to the PLO as a result of a July 1975 arms deal.

(U) Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Iraq also provided medical and food supplies via Damascus.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The United Arab Emirates sent 70 tons of medicine, 20 military vehicles (trucks) and seven cars (probably ambulances).

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) During the war in Lebanon, the Vatican donated medical supplies to both sides; Fatah was the recipient for the Palestinians.

(S/NOFORN) Between 1970 and the end of 1977, BSO used counterfeit passports of 16 nations. Many had been forged in late 1972. In 1978, evidence of new BSO travel document-producing capability surfaced with the appearance of two new forgeries.

Finances:

(U) The Palestine National Bank (Fund) is the fundraising arm of the PLO. It prepares and implements the budget in accordance with PLO/Executive Committee directives. Most PLO funds are allocated to Fatah which determines and makes distribution to other PLO member groups. Fatah keeps about 75 percent.

(U) In 1976, PLO revenues allegedly totaled $90 million. Most of the money came from Arab governments, either individually or jointly by the Arab League. In 1978, the League established a Unified Arab Fund for the Support of Palestinians Under Occupation to support the Palestinian citizens' economic, social and national steadfastness and to prevent the occupied lands from becoming part of Israel. For 1978-82, the fund is supposed to total $1,147 million of which $182.28 million is expected to be disbursed in 1979. The PLO is represented on the fund's governing committee.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) During the war in Lebanon, the head of the Palestine National Bank ordered a large Abu Dhabi contribution to the PLO to be transferred entirely to a Fatah Swiss bank account. This may not have been an unusual procedure.

(S/NOFORN) Fatah reportedly has a distinct budget about which little is known.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Many fundraising mechanisms exist. "Liberation taxes" are levied on Palestinians in government service, and sometimes in the private sector, of Arab countries, especially in the Persian

Gulf. Not all these governments, however, readily forward this head tax. Kuwait has a complex relationship with the PLO and keeps funds acquired "on PLO behalf" and disburses them at key times to exert pressure on the movement. Perceived anti-Kuwaiti actions by Palestinians have provoked temporary but complete suspensions of assistance. On the other hand, Kuwaiti authorities decided not to interfere with a technically illegal Palestinian collection effort launched in connection with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Businessmen in the Palestinian community in Kuwait, not trusting local PLO offices, prefer to transfer their donations directly to Lebanon.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Dubai has been known to keep for itself revenues collected for the Palestinian cause. In March 1978, in exchange for assurances that there would be no demonstrations, the United Arab Emirates Government sent the PLO $10,000.

(U) Saudi Arabia is the PLO's most steadfast financial supporter. It gives approximately $40 million in aid each year through a collaborative effort of the royal family and a 5 percent tax on PLO members resident in the kingdom.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In August 1975, Iraq resumed a $300,000 monthly subsidy to Fatah in an attempt to counter Syrian influence in Lebanon. It is unlikely that Fatah received any Iraqi funds during the summer 1978 feud. Reconciliations since then, however, may have brought about a restoration of Iraqi assistance.

(U) PLO offices, sometimes fronts for terrorist operations and manned by Fatah emissaries, are funded by the Arab League and frequently by host governments.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) BSO operations and Fatah incursions into Israel are financed by Fatah which sometimes receives money specifically earmarked for terrorism. Libya is one such donor, but its contributions are not dependable. Some funds from Libya were cut off in November 1976 when Libya disagreed with Fatah's policy of abiding by the decisions of the Riyadh Summit to end fighting in Lebanon. In February 1977, Libya donated $1 million to the PLO with the stipulation that it was not to be used by Fatah or any organization dominated by Fatah. In June 1977, Libya resumed its regular funding of the PLO.

(U) In June 1978, Libya allegedly offered Fatah, the PFLP and PFLP-General Command $40 million to undertake armed action in the occupied territory. It also reportedly offered to finance the Palestinian arms deal with East Germany.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Fatah's Mu'assah ash Shuhada (The Martyr's Establishment) invests in profitmaking works in order to pay dividends to families of fedayeen killed in action. It runs small industries in Lebanon and agricultural enterprises in several African nations. Plans for expansion of these endeavors in 1977-79 were extensive.

(C/NOFORN) In mid-1978, one source of unknown reliability detailed th following Fatah investments: vegetable and wheat farms in Syria; vegetabl farms in Lebanon; fruit and date farms and a canning factory in Iraq; vege- table farms in Algeria; banana and tobacco farms, stock in a tobacco factory sheep and cattle ranches and one meat canning factory in Sudan; wheat an vegetable farms in Somalia and Mauritania; vegetable and fruit farms in Libya vegetable farms in Chad; arms factories, vegetable farms, cattle ranches, an lumber mills in Uganda; vegetable farms in Tunisia and Morocco and stock in sardine factory in Morocco.

(U) It was disclosed that as much as $5 million in fraudulent insuranc claims were collected by Middle East students in the United States betwee 1971 and 1976 and channeled to the PLO and other Arab nationalist groups.

(U) Allegedly, the main purpose of a long-running drug smuggling opera- tion from northern Lebanon through Bulgaria and into Western Europe was t provide PLO funds.

(C) Various international support groups contribute to the PLO.

International connections:

(U) In addition to the numerous headquarters/bases, weapons, trainin and financial ties to foreign governments and to foreigners noted above, Fata and the PLO have other, even more extensive and varied international rela- tions.

(U) The PLO, recognized by over 100 nations and many international for as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, is physically repre- sented in some form in at least 61 countries, has observer status at th United Nations General Assembly, and is a full member of the United Nation Economic Council for Western Asia, a subcommittee of UNESCO, and of other U organs and specialized agencies. The PLO regularly sends delegations t international conferences and on good will and aid-seeking missions. As th largest and most influential member of the PLO, and the one providing mos diplomatic manpower. Fatah undoubtedly benefits from these connections.

(U) In Arab countries, Fatah offices have diplomatic privileges and con- tacts with domestic government leaders, political parties, opposition group and insurgents.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In Kuwait, through the family of Khali and Hani al Hasan, two important Fatah leaders, Fatah has good, but no uninhibited, access to and influence with the royal family. Since the war i Lebanon, the June 1976 involvement of another Fatah faction in antiregim activities and the arrest of five Fatah members in connection with bombings all Palestinian groups in Kuwait have been regarded with increased suspicion The government's use of financial leverage is described above.

(C) Qatar allegedly had issued passports to PLO members. Some others travel on Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) documents.

(U) Fatah spokesmen objected to the Arab League freeze on relations with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) after the killings of the YAR and PDRY Presidents in June 1978.

(S) In the early 1970s, some contacts of uncertain dimensions were known to exist with Iranian guerrillas who may have assisted Fatah/BSO with travel arrangements, bogus documents and weapons acquisition, in exchange for train- ing.

(U) As early as 1968, Iranian revolutionary/religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had expressed support for Fatah. He wrote several articles tying Islam to the Palestinian cause.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The PLO established close contacts with the Ayatollah after he arrived in France in October 1978. As the Iranian upheaval developed, Khomeini used the PLO network in the Persian Gulf area to communicate with Iranians settled there and to obtain financial contributions for his movement.

(U) Before Khomeini returned to Iran, he pledged to give the PLO an office in Teheran and to provide backing for an independent Palestinian state.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) After Khomeini's return to Iran, the PLO served as an intermediary between him and some Arab governments.

(C/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Arafat sent Palestinian forces to Iran to help the Ayatollah deal with recalcitrant rebel factions.

(U) During 1978, PLO printing presses in Beirut produced Iranian Tudeh (Communist) Party publications.

(C/NOFORN) In November 1978, Tunisian workers in Libya reportedly were given training and sent to fight with the Palestinians in Lebanon. Qadhafi aims to foster the creation of a Tunisian Liberation Front from this core group.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In return for permission to establish a PLO office in Nicosia, Fatah agreed to train Greek Cypriots in terrorist tactics. Members of Vassos Lyssarides' United Democratic Union of the Center (EDEK), a Socialist political party, who were designated to form armed groups in Cyprus in 1975, had received PLO military training. Lyssarides remains the closest Fatah/PLO supporter (collaborator?) in Cyprus.

(C) In 1971 and 1972, Fatah trained Turkish radical students who later emerged in the forefront of violent leftist groups in Turkey.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) Fatah supplied arms to the Turkish People's Liberation Army and, perhaps, the Revolutionary Youth Federation (Dev Genc).

(C) Allegedly, Provisional Irish Republican Army members were trained in Palestinian camps in Lebanon in 1978. In 1977, the Provos had obtained sophisticated Soviet arms from Fatah and Palestinian spokesmen have said that they consider the Irish struggle similar to their own.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In the summer of 1978, Fatah ran a camp in Lebanon for supporters from Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, West Germany, France and Italy.

(C) Two Fatah affiliates, the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) and the General Union of Palestinian Workers (GUPW), have large branches in West Germany which operate as the Arab Student Association (ASA), and the Arabian Workers of Stuttgart, Giessen, Frankfurt, Karlsruhe or Bonn, etc. With money received from Arab embassies in Bonn, the student groups fund propaganda and stage mass meetings. GUPS also has branches in Italy, England, Greece and France. A strong Fatah cell operates in Stuttgart. Groups such as the Federation of Palestinian Youth, Workers and Students and The Return, among others, operate among emigrants in West German localities.

(C) West German radicals give moral support and financial assistance to the Palestinian resistance movement and various West German terrorists have operational ties to specific Palestinian groups, including Fatah. West German leftists fought the post-Munich massacre ban on the GUPS and GUPW. The League Against Imperialism has PLO ties and the League of Communists' West German Near East Committee has made financial contributions to the PLO. The 2d of June Movement sought Fatah advice on which Arab countries might offer asylum after a February 1975 kidnaping in West Berlin. A past member of the Communist Party of Germany/Marxist-Leninist, with connections to Fatah, was killed when a bomb he was carrying exploded at Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv in May 1976.

(C) Members of the Spanish Maoist terrorist organization, the Anti-fascist and Patriotic Revolutionary Front (FRAP), participated in pro-Palestinian demonstrations in West Germany.

(S) The Committee for Peace and Justice in the Middle East, with the Belgian-Palestinian Committee as a member, is a Communist-controlled peace movement providing a Palestinian platform. The Solidarity with the Palestinian Revolution and Arab People organization in Belgium is pro-PLO.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) PLO's office in Sweden receives financial support from the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The PLO office in Rome is the main pickup point for terrorist documentation in Europe.

(C) The Italian Students Movement (MS) and Workers Power (Potere Operaio) had ties to the PLO in Switzerland and East Germany.

(S) Fatah trains and aids members of the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT).

(U) In mid-1978, the Fatah Executive Committee allegedly decided to try to prevent further deterioration of the position of Eritrean liberation organizations and to work for their unification. Muhammad Salih was sent to the PDRY in July 1978 to discuss ways in which a united Eritrean organization could negotiate with Ethiopia.

(C/NOFORN) In the summer of 1977, the Palestinians had had sufficient stores to sell arms to the Eritrean Liberation Front/Popular Liberation Forces (ELF/PLF) in tandem with Syria.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Fatah has well-established ties with Somalia and has sent about 800 Palestinian laborers to work there. Other agricultural and commercial investment activities in Africa were noted.

(U) Uganda supplied 27 Ugandan passports for Palestinians, including one for a known Fatah terrorist.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In April 1978, PLO troops were ferried from Libya to Uganda to perform internal security functions for Idi Amin; the length of their stay is unknown. Training ties to Uganda were mentioned above.

(U) Arafat concluded a military cooperation agreement of unknown dimensions with Cuban President Fidel Castro in 1978.

(U) The Palestinians are providing weapons and training to Argentine Montoneros and, in exchange, received a new formula for plastic explosives. Montonero military chief Mendizabel visited Lebanon in June 1978 and met with his counterpart, Khalil al Wazir, to review cooperation with Fatah. In September 1978, he made another visit, at the invitation of the PLO, and again conferred with Wazir. In Latin America, contacts between the PLO and the Montoneros occurred in Mexico City.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The Argentine-dominated Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) reportedly has some ties with Fatah.

(U) In 1965, the People's Republic of China became the first major power to support the Palestinian nationalist movement. PRC-Fatah ties are still very friendly, some were described under training and weapons support.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In June 1977, a member of the London-based Tamil Revolutionary Liberation Group (TRLG) discussed possible PLO supply of

arms to the TRLG with the PLO representative in Colombo, Sri Lanka. Allegedly, in June 1976, the PLO had promised to provide financial, training and arms aid for the Tamil radicals.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The Japanese Floating Chrysanthemum Society, a right-wing group, has had ties to the PLO since 1972 and has remitted funds. The Japan-Arab Cultural Society, the Japan-Palestine Friendship Society, the Japanese Communist Party and its Japan Committee for Solidarity with the Palestinian People, the Palestine People's Support Center, the Kansai New Left Society, the Kansai Committee to Support the Palestinian People, and the Japan Arab Exchange Society are among the plethora of leftwing groups offering various forms of tangible support in propaganda, solidarity, funds and medical assistance for the PLO. Some are Japanese Red Army support groups as well.

(S/NOFORN) In June 1973, Vietcong advisers were reported in Fatah camps in Lebanon and Syria.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Secret Fatah units with six to eight members function in Algeria, Egypt, India, Italy, Pakistan, Yugoslavia and, perhaps, Guatemala.

(C) Ties to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Cuba and the PRC, mentioned in preceding subsections, are complexly involved with international political developments, evolving Palestinian policies and ongoing military situations. Remarkably, Fatah has been able to nurture significant relations with both the Soviet Union and China.

(U) The PLO representative in the Soviet Union is accredited to the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Committee. Fatah is not independently represented in Moscow; but frequent leadership visits occur.

Event analysis:

(U) Until 1975, major Fatah/BSO incidents were perpetrated in various non-Middle Eastern, especially European, countries by terrorists bearing light arms--rifles, handguns, handgrenades. In 1972-73, several daring and dramatic exploits, including sensational hijackings, kidnapings and assassinations were perpetrated each year. Non-Israelis and non-Israeli interests were directly targeted as were Israelis and their interests. Operational aims were to free terrorist colleagues being held in European prisons or to achieve immediate political goals. Several events ended with terrorists obtaining safe-haven in Arab lands; others ended when terrorists were killed or wounded by nonspecialized antiterrorist efforts.

(U) Beginning in March 1975, less frequent major events planned by Khalil al Wazir for Fatah superseded BSO domination. Targets were inside

Israel and terrorists infiltrated by sea. Among their arms were more sophisticated pieces--bazookas and mortars as well as higher grade explosives. Perpetrators seemed as intent on obtaining higher Israeli civilian death tolls as on the release of terrorists from Israeli jails. Specialized antiterrorist responses were also more intense. Fatah's anomalous anti-Iraq terrorism of international scope during the summer of 1978 was restricted to Iraqi Government targets.

Significant activities:

(U) While details of intermittent, headline-creating, hostage-taking incidents serve to heighten expectations of future terrorist activity and facilitate antiterrorist planning, Fatah, today, is relatively less oriented to that kind of action than in the past. Fatah's own emphasis is on the "legitimate armed struggle" against the enemy on enemy-controlled land. The trend is toward disruption of daily Israeli life and killing Israelis. Small bombing incidents, too numerous and seemingly insignificant to detail, form the substance of Palestinian terrorism. This "warfare" is escalating and is provoked by increasing peacemaking events which exclude the Palestinians from the determination of their own destiny. By terrorism, the fedayeen seek to enter the peacemaking process or else disrupt it.

January 1965 - (U) Blew up an Israeli pumping station said to be diverting waters of the Jordan River. (Fatah)

November 1971 - (U) Assassinated Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al Tal in Cairo. (BSO)

December 1971 - (U) Attempted to assassinate Jordanian Ambassador in London. (BSO)

February 1972 - (U) Assassinated five Jordanians in West Germany.

- (U) Attacked a West German factory in Hamburg and blew up a natural gas installation in the same city.

- (U) Sabotaged an industrial site in the Netherlands. (BSO)

May 1972 - (U) Hijacked an El Al plane en route from Brussels to Tel Aviv and forced it to land in Tel Aviv. Four terrorists armed with grenades and handguns held 104 hostages. They demanded the release of 317 Palestinians from Israeli jails and safe passage to Egypt. Negotiations were undertaken; the original deadline set by the terrorists was extended. About 23 hours after the plane had landed, approximately 12 Israeli Defense Force paratroopers stormed the plane, surprising the terrorists. Two terrorists were killed, the other two captured, including one wounded. One hostage was killed and four wounded. (BSO)

August 1972 - (U) Sabotaged Trans-Alpine oil terminal in Trieste. (BSO)

September 1972 - (U) Perpetrated the mass kidnaping/murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. Before dawn, eight terrorists, armed with automatic rifles and handgrenades, took over the Israeli compound at the Olympic Village, killing two Israelis and taking nine hostage. The terrorists demanded the release of 200 Palestinians from Israeli jails and safe passage out of the country. Negotiations were undertaken. German authorities made no concessions of substance, but did arrange for a bus and helicopters to transport the terrorists and their hostages to Furstenfeldbruck Airport for a flight to Egypt. The incident was terminated at 3 a.m. on the second day when local Munich police, supported by some military personnel, launched an assault on the terrorists. Sharpshooters opened fire from strategic locations, but no attempt was made to storm the two helicopters carrying the terrorists and their hostages. In the ensuing shootout, a helicopter was blown up by the terrorists, all hostages were killed. Five terrorists were killed, three wounded and captured. One member of the German assault force was killed and one wounded.

- (U) Claimed responsibility for sending a letter bomb that killed an Israeli diplomat in London. (BSO)

October 1972 - (U) Hijacked a Lufthansa jet, threatened to blow up the plane and all 20 passengers aboard unless terrorists accused of the Munich massacre were released. The West German Government agreed to release the prisoners and the terrorists ordered the plane to land at Munich. A large police presence at the airport dissuaded the terrorists from landing and they flew to Zagreb, Yugoslavia, instead. When the West German release of prisoners was confirmed, the terrorists and their hostages flew to Libya. The hostages were released unharmed. (BSO)

December 1972 - (U) Seized the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok, taking six hostages. Four terrorists armed with submachineguns demanded the release of 36 Palestinians from Israeli jails and set a deadline for compliance. They were talked out of a threat to kill the hostages by the Egyptian Ambassador and Thai officials, who promised the terrorists safe passage to Egypt. On the following day, the terrorists and hostages were conveyed to the airport. The hostages were released and the terrorists were flown to Egypt with the Egyptian Ambassador and two Thai officials. Israel released no prisoners. (BSO)

March 1973 - (U) Seized the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, taking five diplomats hostage. The terrorists demanded the release of terrorist and criminal prisoners by Jordan, West Germany, Israel and the United States, including Sirhan Sirhan, convicted assassin of Robert Kennedy. On the next day, when their demands were rejected, the terrorists murdered one Belgian and two American diplomats. They held a Saudi and a Jordanian diplomat 2 more days and then released them. (BSO)

July 1973 - (U) May have been involved in the assassination of an Israeli military attache in Washington, D.C. (BSO)

June 1974 - (U) Murdered an Israeli family in Nahariya, Israel. Three terrorists, armed with submachineguns and grenades, occupied an apartment, held the family of four hostage, then killed them. No demands were made before Israeli troops stormed the building, killing all three perpetrators. One member of the Israeli assault force was killed, five wounded. (Fatah)

October 1974 - (S/NOFORN) Planned Rabat Arab Summit assassinations; plot was aborted. (BSO)

March 1975 - (U) Carried out kidnapings, assault and bombing of Savoy Hotel, Tel Aviv. Eight terrorists in two rubber dinghies were dropped off a ship about 25 miles from Tel Aviv. Dressed in Israeli Army fatigues, the terrorists were surprised on the beach and one of their boats was blown up by an off-duty Israeli soldier, who was killed by return fire. The terrorists worked their way inland, indiscriminately firing at a crowd leaving a cinema. At the Savoy Hotel they took 10 hostages. Their demands included: a United Nations plane to take them and their hostages to Damascus; mediation by French, Greek and/or Vatican Ambassadors; the release of Archbishop Capucci; and that the French Ambassador accompany them. Israeli police surrounded the hotel and sealed off the area, but were held at bay by the terrorists who were armed with explosives, grenades and submachineguns and fired from the roof or top floor. Hundreds of Israeli soldiers were deployed and, 6 hours after the start of the incident, a unit stormed the building. The terrorists detonated an explosive charge after a brief exchange of fire. Seven terrorists, three hostages and three soldiers were killed. Many more were injured. One terrorist was taken prisoner. (Fatah)

September 1975 - (U) Seized the Egyptian Embassy in Madrid. Four terrorists took the Ambassador, the Consul, a press attache and six Spanish employees of the Embassy hostage. The Spanish hostages were released immediately; but the three Egyptians were held. The terrorists threatened to kill the hostages unless Egypt repudiated the Sinai disengagement accord. Specifically, they demanded that Egypt refrain from signing implementation documents for the interim agreement; that officials attending the Geneva talks issue a public statement labeling the accord a betrayal of the Egyptian and Arab people; and that Egypt leave the Geneva meeting altogether. The terrorists declared that explosives had been planted at the embassy entrance and in all of its windows; they were armed with explosives and knives. Negotiations were conducted by the Ambassadors of Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait and Jordan. Early the next morning, the terrorists, their hostages and the Iraqi and Algerian Ambassadors left the embassy under police escort and were driven to the airport. A plane took them to Algeria where the hostages were freed. (BSO)

June 1976 - (S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Fatah youth corps implicated in series of Damascus bombings. (Fatah)

November 1977 - (U) Fired rockets, killing one and injuring five at Nahariya, Israel. (Fatah)

February 1978 - (U) Assassinated a West Bank notable accused of collaborating with Israeli authorities in Ram Allah. (PLO)

- (U) Bombed a crowded civilian bus in Jerusalem, killing 2 and injuring 46. (PLO)

March 1978 - (U) Staged massive assault on Tel Aviv-Haifa Road. Thirteen terrorists embarked from a small Lebanese fishing port aboard a Greek freighter which dropped them in two rubber dinghies in Israeli territorial waters. En route to the shore one boat capsized and two terrorists drowned. On the beach, they stopped an American woman, questioned her as to their location and murdered her. On the highway, they shot at several cars, commandeered a taxi, killing the driver, and seized a bus which overtook another bus. The passengers were gathered in one vehicle; in all, over 100 hostages were taken. The terrorists were well armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles, M-16 rifles, RPG bazookas, Czech mortars, grenades and explosives. They carried leaflets demanding the release of Arab prisoners from Israeli jails. Their intent was to take over a Tel Aviv hotel and negotiate with the British and Romanian Ambassadors and a United Nations official for an airplane and their five imprisoned comrades. As the hostage-packed bus proceeded toward Tel Aviv, the terrorists fired at a police jeep which tried to block the road. Further along, two police vans successfully barred the way. As the bus slowed down, border police fired at its tires. During a 10-minute battle, one of the Palestinians' grenades blew up. The final toll included: 34 Israelis killed, 80 wounded (one policeman killed and nine wounded); nine terrorists killed, two captured.

April 1978 - (U) Bombed a bus carrying West German kibbutz volunteers on a sightseeing trip, killing two, injuring five.

June 1978 - (U) Bombed a bus with a device rigged from an 81-mm mortar shell, killing five (including one American) and injuring 20, in Jerusalem. (Al Fatah)

- (U) Attempted an assault on an Israeli settlement. Four terrorists crossed the Jordan River, scaled the fence surrounding Mehola, fired assault rifles and hurled a grenade at village guards.

- (U) Exploded a bomb at the Mehaneh Yehuda market in West Jerusalem, killing two and injuring 37. Incident coincided with visit of Vice President Mondale. (Fatah)

July 1978 - (U) Attempted assassination in London of Iraqi Ambassador to Britain by throwing a grenade under his car. The Ambassador was not in his car at the time; two bystanders were injured. (Fatah)

- (C/NOFORN) Assaulted Iraqi Embassy in Paris. Two terrorists entered the embassy. When questioned by guards, they produced submachineguns and revolvers, shooting one guard who tried to disarm them. When an Iraqi escaped to call for police, one terrorist fled. The other remained inside the embassy, exploded a handgrenade and held five hostages. He demanded an aircraft to fly to London and freedom for the woman held there in connection with the attempted assassination above. The terrorist was persuaded to surrender to French police. As this group walked toward a police car, Iraqi Embassy security guards opened fire: a French police inspector was killed and two policemen injured; the terrorist was injured; one Iraqi guard was killed and one injured. (Fatah)

August 1978 - (U) Launched attack at Iraqi Consulate in Karachi. Two gunmen, riding a motorcycle, tried to follow the Iraqi Consul General's car into the consulate grounds. A guard stopped them at the gate; the gunmen shot the guard, who managed to kill one of the terrorists with his bayonet. An administrative aide who was riding in the consul's car was wounded.

- (U) Exploded a bomb, containing nails and ball bearings, at the Carmel Market in Tel Aviv, killing one and injuring 48. (PLO and PFLP claimed responsibility)

September 1978 - (C) Sent letter bombs to Iraqi diplomatic facilities in Bonn, London and Washington; none exploded.

September 1978 - (U) Attempted to blow up a boat containing 42 122-mm rockets and explosives on Eilat beach. The boat, carrying nine terrorists and their munitions, refused to stop when intercepted by an Israeli naval patrol in the Gulf of Aqaba, about 100 kilometers south of Eilat. The Israelis opened fire, causing the boat to explode. Two terrorists were killed; seven captured, including three wounded.

November 1978 - (U) Bombed a bus carrying tourists and Israelis between Jericho and Jerusalem on the West Bank, killing four and injuring 40. Incident commemorated the first anniversary of Sadat's trip to Jerusalem.

January 1979 - (U) Exploded a bomb in downtown Netanya, killing two and injuring 51, including a British tourist.

As-Sa'iqa (The Thunderbolt)

Executive Summary

(C) A creation of the Syrian Ba'th Party, Sa'iqa's orientation and goals as part of the Palestinian resistance movement are invariably identical with Syrian national interests as they relate to the movement. With the exception of the 1976 Syrian-Palestinian confrontation in Lebanon, during which it sided with Syria, Sa'iqa has been part of the moderate mainstream of the Palestine Liberation Organization. It seeks the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) With 2,500 members, over half of whom are members of the Syrian Armed Forces, Sa'iqa is the second largest fedayeen group. Its branch-type organization is answerable to the Syrian Army G-2; training is with the Syrian military and from its instructors and Soviet advisors; arms, generally of Soviet and Warsaw Pact manufacture, are of Syrian origin and include SA-7 missiles, antiaircraft and antitank weapons.

(U) Constrained by its Syrian tie, Sa'iqa is not known for actions in Israel and the occupied territories. Its only international terrorist operation was aimed at disrupting Soviet Jewish emigration and took place in Western Europe.

As-Sa'iqa (The Thunderbolt)

Orientation/Goals:

(U) A Trojan horse maneuvering for Syria within the Palestinian movement. Sa'iqa's aims at any given moment are identical with those of Syria. Knowledge of Syria's policy, therefore, facilitates determination of Sa'iqa's orientation and goals. Sa'iqa and Syria were in full agreement with the PLO move toward accepting a Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip and participation in the Geneva Conference. Sa'iqa supported the Syrian incursion into Lebanon, thereby splitting with most other Palestinian groups. Reconciliation took place with common opposition to the Sadat peace initiative which provoked Sa'iqa leaders to urge the Egyptian Army to overthrow or assassinate their president. The emergent Syrian-Iraqi understanding has prompted comparable developments among Sa'iqa and Iraqi-sponsored fedayeen groups, especially the Arab Liberation Front.

Estimated strength:

(U) 2,500.

Principal leader:

(U) Zuhayr Muhsin. Born in Tulkarm approximately in 1936.

(C) A refugee, Muhsin joined the Ba'th Party as a teenager; he was arrested by Jordanian authorities when the party was banned in 1957. Subsequently, he taught school in Qatar, but was deported for illegal political activities. Muhsin lived in Kuwait until 1967 when he moved to Damascus and became active in Ba'th Party politics once more as a supporter of Salah Jedid.

(C) Muhsin joined Sa'iqa soon after its establishment in 1967 and, in 1968, became leader of Sa'iqa forces in Lebanon and vice chairman of the Palestine National Council.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) After the Asad coup in Syria in 1971, Muhsin quickly established a rapport with the new leader and assumed overall control of Sa'iqa.

(C) In 1971, he was named to the PLO/Executive Committee and took command of the Military Department in 1971.

(C) Muhsin is completely subservient to the Syrian Government in all matters concerning Palestinian affairs and a Middle East settlement. This link determined his behavior in Lebanon as a tool of Syrian policy. Because of his conduct, however, Muhsin was discredited and hated by all other

fedayeen groups and leaders (except the PFLP-GC and Ahmad Jibril). After the Sadat initiative, Muhsin reconciled with many of his fellow leaders, especially Arafat.

Background:

(C) Created at the Ninth Congress of the Syrian Ba'th Party (BPS) in 1966, Sa'iqa forces subsequently crossed into Lebanon which was forced by Syria to accede to their presence. More prominent after the 1967 War, Sa'iqa began operations against Israel in late 1969.

(U) Sa'iqa sided with Syria throughout the war in Lebanon. Because of this policy, it was alienated from other fedayeen groups, especially the rejectionists with whom intermittent clashes continued into early 1978. The first reconciliation between Sa'iqa and other Palestinian groups had occurred after the Shtawrah accord in July 1977 when Sa'iqa participated in joint patrols with Fatah without rancor. By May 1978, Zuhayr Muhsin made known his tacit agreement with the substance of the Rejection Front/DFLP memorandum objecting to "unilateral" PLO decisionmaking and thereby reentered the mainstream of intra-Palestinian discord.

(U) Sa'iqa praised the January 1979 Palestine National Council session and urged all parties to continue the democratic dialog. The group is generally optimistic about the prospects for comprehensive unity between Syria and Iraq and for similar unity between those countries protege fedayeen groups.

Tactics/Methods of operation:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Sa'iqa reportedly ended trans-Jordanian forays in January 1976 in line with the Syrian-Jordanian rapprochement and does not undertake terrorist operations. Its commando raids against Israel and the occupied territories had not been especially notable. Recent claims of responsibility for incidents conflict with those of other, more active, fedayeen groups. All exploits in the Middle East and Western Europe were authorized, and perhaps planned, by the Syrian Army G-2. Sa'iqa's infamous anti-Soviet Jewish emigration actions and plots were attributed to the "Secret Organization."

Organization:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Sa'iqa has a general military command and administrative, security, technical affairs, armaments and operations branches. Reorganization measures in November 1976 were intended to tighten ties to the BPS.

(C/NOFORN) Control is exercised by the Syrian Army G-2. Approximately 50 percent of the rank and file and 75 percent of the officers are members of the Syrian Armed Forces.

Headquarters/Bases:

(U) Headquartered in both Damascus and Beirut, Sa'iqa is based in Lebanese refugee camps with major concentrations of forces in Beirut and Tripoli.

(C/NOFORN) After having been temporarily ejected from some sites in Lebanon, due to the Syrian-Palestinian contretemps, Sa'iqa has reestablished itself. By early March 1978, it reentered the important Tyre refugee camps and set up offices in Tyre. At the same time, strong Sa'iqa contingents were placed near Bint Jubayl and Ra's Marun. With the Israeli invasion, in mid-March, Sa'iqa moved its control center and forces to Nabatiyah, which had long been a main supply point. Subsequently, some troops were shifted northeastward from Nabatiyah to Zifta.

(C/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) Sa'iqa has military bases in the Damascus area and storage sites in Syria.

Training:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Members are trained in guerrilla tactics and the use of antiaircraft weapons by squadron leaders and Syrian Army instructors who study in the Soviet Union.

Weapons:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) The Syrian Government provides almost all weapons, including SA-7 missiles (controlled by Syrian Army personnel), antiaircraft weapons, 122-mm rocket launchers, RPG-7 grenade launchers, AT-3 antitank guided missiles, Belgian Energa antitank launchers and projectiles, and German Cobra antitank missiles. It also provides Romanian trucks, jeeps, blankets, medical supplies and food.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In April 1978, Sa'iqa military officers were scheduled to visit Algeria to select Soviet equipment.

Finances:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) Syrian Army members and retirees who serve with Sa'iqa receive a maximum monthly salary of $135. Other Sa'iqa members and the organization receive Syrian Government subsidies.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) Some Sa'iqa security cells reportedly engage in narcotics sales; others, in protection rackets involving drug dealers.

International connections:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Sa'iqa is not known for its foreign relations. The proposed arms acquisition trip to Algeria would be a novel occurrence and may be followed by cooperation with other members of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. Libya is the most likely possibility.

Event analysis:

(U) The only major Sa'iqa operation and significant, but aborted, plot were aimed at disrupting Soviet Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and immigration to Israel. Since the early 1920s, the immigration issue has been at the heart of the Arab-Jewish conflict; yet, only Sa'iqa seems [illegible] its contemporary importance. Immigrants provide a continuing [illegible] strengthening of the Israeli enemy. Hence, because the Soviets have permitted a major increase in emigration over the past year, the possibility of Sa'iqa's resumption of activity cannot be discounted.

(U) Trains are a unique Sa'iqa target.

Significant activities:

September 1973 - (U) Kidnaped three Soviet Jewish emigrants and an Austrian customs official on a train enroute from Moscow to Vienna and commandeered a car to Vienna Airport. The two terrorists threatened to kill their prisoners and themselves if they were not given an airplane to fly to an unspecified Arab country. They also demanded that an Austrian transit camp for emigrating Soviet Jews be closed. The terrorists were permitted to leave the country in a small aircraft which eventually landed in Libya after stops in Yugoslavia, Sicily and Sardinia. Subsequently, the Austrian Government announced that, in order to save the lives of the hostages, it had agreed to shut down the Schoenau Castle facilities through which Soviet Jews passed on their way to Israel. It was believed that Libyan authorities set the terrorists free.

September 1975 - (U) Planned to hijack a Dutch train to force a statement by the Netherlands Government that it would cease support for the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel. The plot was never carried out.

February 1976 - (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Looted and destroyed pro-Iraq Rejection Front newspaper offices in Lebanon.

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)

Executive Summary

(U) The DFLP is a pro-Soviet, Marxist organization, seeking a revolution of the working class throughout the Middle East. It follows an independent course in the Palestine resistance movement. Because of its acceptance of a Palestinian state on any liberated territory as an interim stage, the DFLP is not rejectionist. Yet, because of its unswerving ideological frame of reference, its unsatisfied pretensions to be accepted as a major fedayeen group, and its general criticism of the Palestine Liberation Organization decisionmaking process and dialog with Jordan, the DFLP is not part of the moderate PLO mainstream either.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Organized like a Communist party with a politburo, central committee, and cells, the DFLP is known for its continuous and rigorous ideological self-criticism.

(C/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) Many of its 500 to 600 members have been trained in the Soviet Union, East Germany, Iraq or Cuba. Although information on DFLP weaponry is scant, arms presumably come from Communist sources.

(U) Almost all DFLP terrorist operations have taken place in Israel and the occupied territories. In 1974, it undertook a devastating hostage-taking action in Israel and perpetrated another massacre; both incidents were aimed at obtaining the release of jailed comrades. Despite attempts, those feats have not been duplicated.

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)
[in previous editions: Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP)]

Orientation/Goals:

(U) Committed to Marxism, the pro-Soviet DFLP believes that the Palestinian national goal cannot be achieved apart from the revolution of the working class. Furthermore, elite cadres should not be separate from the masses. Rather, the lower classes should be educated in true socialism first, and then they will carry on the battle. The DFLP seeks these revolutionary changes in Arab countries, especially conservative monarchies, as a precursor to the achievement of Palestinian objectives. The DFLP engages in vigorous and continuing ideological and organizational self-criticism.

(U) Not completely identified with either moderates or rejectionists, the DFLP is an independent group whose policy orientation is contingent solely upon how changing Middle East events are perceived via its preconceived ideological frame of reference.

(U) At the Palestine National Council (PNC) session in the spring of 1977, the DFLP totally supported the Palestine national program, seeking the creation of a Palestinian state on any liberated territory and affirming PLO willingness to attend the Geneva Peace Conference. Acceptance of an interim stage of statehood before the achievement of the ultimate goal of a unified, democratic state on the entire Palestinian soil as defined by the British Mandate is the main difference between the views of the DFLP and the mainstream of the Rejection Front as represented by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

(U) The DFLP labeled the Sadat peace initiative a "total surrender to Israel" and issued public death threats against Sadat's "collaborators." The DFLP disapproves of the PLO leadership's failure to take stronger action against Sadat and sees a PLO trend tied to Saudi Arabian interests and to the right of the steadfastness summits and the Syrian-Iraqi understanding.

(U) DFLP completely rejects the PLO-Jordan dialog because it gives King Hussein the right to share representation of the Palestinian people with the PLO. Hussein is perceived as wanting to annex the West Bank again, as depriving the PLO of activity among the Palestinian masses in Jordan, and as prohibiting military actions against Israel from Jordanian territory--all of which the DFLP opposes.

(U) The DFLP repeatedly "affirms its hostility and resistance to US policy in the region," its support for the nonalined bloc and its solidarity with all national liberation movements that fight against imperialism and racism.

(U) The DFLP calls for relations between the PLO and "anti-Zionist, democratic and progressive Jewish forces."

Estimated strength:

(U) 500 to 600.

Principal leaders:

(U) Nayaf Hawatmah (Abu Nouf). Born 1931 in As Salt, Jordan.

(U) In 1954, Hawatmah joined the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) which had been founded by George Habash, now head of the PFLP. In 1957, Hawatmah was imprisoned and then exiled from Jordan because of his political activities. He moved to Iraq where he was jailed again. Freed, he left for Beirut in 1963 and continued his ANM activism while studying at the Arab University. In 1967, Hawatmah went to the newly independent People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) to advise its leaders; he subsequently wrote a book about this experience. He was able to return home, to Jordan, under a general amnesty in 1968.

(U) Hawatmah was a prime mover behind the DFLP split from the PFLP in 1968. A pure revolutionary, his opposition to PFLP leaders was both ideological and personal. Hawatmah is secretary general of the DFLP. His preeminent position in the organization which has a comparatively collegial decisionmaking process, is unchallenged.

(U) 'Umar Adib 'Abid Rabbuh (Abu Yasir). Born 1941.

(C) Rabbuh was also a member of the Arab Nationalist Movement and reportedly assisted George Habash in setting up the PFLP in 1967. In the following year, however, he joined Hawatmah in leaving the PFLP to form the DFLP of which he is now deputy secretary general.

(C) Rabbuh is DFLP representative on the PLO/Executive Committee and head of the PLO Department of Information. He has been included in many PLO traveling delegations, most notably to the Rabat Arab Summit in 1974, the United Nations General Assembly in 1977, and several missions to the Soviet Union.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Tariq Hamdan is the pseudonym Rabbuh uses to sign news articles reflecting DFLP leadership views.

Background:

(U) The DFLP was formed in February 1969 by educated radicals who had split from the ideologically elitist PFLP.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) During the war in Lebanon, the DFLP wa alined with the Lebanese National Movement, the Lebanese Communist Party an the Communist Action Organization. The group played a strong military an political role in the conflict and believed it had been transformed into more militarily capable fighting unit, deserving a position second only t Fatah in the PLO. Sa'iqa/Syria thwarted this ambition at the March 1977 PN session. Nonetheless, the DFLP appeared to be reconciled to working wit Arafat and Syria.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In 1977 and early 1978, the DFLP demande an unrestricted Palestinian military presence in south Lebanon to wage wa against Israel and no restrictions on Palestinian weapons in Lebanon. Afte the Israeli invasion in March 1978, the DFLP opposed Arafat's attempts t impose moderation on fedayeen actions in the south as well as his suppressio of Fatah dissidents. In May, the DFLP signed the Rejection Front memorandu objecting to "unilateral" decisionmaking in the PLO. Subsequently, it hel coordination meetings with the Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP) an the Popular Struggle Front (PSF). At the January 1979 PNC session, DFL delegates sided with the PFLP on Executive Committee membership and dis bursement issues.

(U) Armed clashes between Fatah and DFLP forces occurred at Nahr a Barid, Albaddawi and Sayda in early January 1979 over the Jordan dialog issue.

Tactics/Methods of operation:

(U) For most of its history, the DFLP eschewed terrorist "adventurism." In 1974, however, the group undertook several dramatic and devastating cross border operations into Israel, such as the massacre of 23 Israeli schoo children at Ma'alot. Israel and the occupied territories continue to be it main targets; the DFLP may be responsible for some of the 1977-79 increase bombings. DFLP cells in Israel and the West Bank have perpetrated severa random attacks against Israeli military targets.

Organization:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The cohesive DFLP is led by a 10-man po litburo and a central committee supported by the rank and file organize regionally. Regional branches receive reports and political information fro the central committee and send comments and intelligence back. Cells in th various regions are set up according to employment or activity. The cells a well as loose university student and women's groups are attached to an supervised by district committees. Central leaders have functional roles.

Headquarters/Bases:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Headquartered with offices in Lebanon, the DFLP's other major offices in Syria were closed during the war in Lebanon. Although tentative plans were made to move to Iraq, no information about resituating has been received and the Palestinian-Syrian reconciliation may have removed the need. Regional branches exist in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq, the PDRY, Cyprus and Israeli-occupied territories. Smaller units, such as branches in Rome and Milan are scattered internationally.

(C/NOFORN) The DFLP has a contingent of about 100 fedayeen based in the vicinity of Nabatiyah, Lebanon.

Training:

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) While instructors from Communist countries sometimes teach at DFLP bases, most military training takes place in the Soviet Union, East Germany and Iraq.

(U) For instance, in the early spring of 1978, 23 cadre left to attend a 6-month infantry training course in the Soviet Union. Prior to their departure, the students were given intensive precourse orientation in Damur, Lebanon. Some commandos also attend classes at the Lenin Institute for Economic Studies in the Soviet Union.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In July 1976, the Cuban Government paid for members to learn vehicle and weapons repair in Cuba. A training agreement was concluded with Cuba in January 1977; its terms are unknown.

Weapons:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Information on most DFLP weapons acquisition is not available. Hawatmah concluded a military supply agreement with Cuba in January 1977; the specifics remain unknown.

Finances:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Iraq and Libya are the only Arab countries making regular contributions to the DFLP. In appreciation for Hawatmah/DFLP support during the Egyptian-Libyan confrontation in the summer of 1977, Libya increased its monthly subsidy to $280,000. Libya has a reputation for making its regular contributions a month or two late. In 1977, Iraqi payments averaged $50,000 a month. In July 1978, to support the DFLP drift toward the Rejection Front and to exacerbate the PLO's internal hemorrhage, Iraq gave the DFLP $3.5 million to continue its "revolution" and opposition to Fatah.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The DFLP also derives funds from members' dues, special levies on sale of Al Hurriyah (its newspaper), and the sale of calendars. DFLP funds are on deposit in Kuwaiti banks.

International connections:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The DFLP's international branches operate in Algeria, Belgium, West Germany, France, Greece, India, Italy, Libya, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, Spain, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, West Berlin and Yugoslavia.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Strong ties to the Soviet Union are fostered by ideological affinity, trips by leaders to and training in the Soviet Union, and aid. The DFLP facilitates Soviet contacts with Persian Gulf governments and insurgents. At the behest of Soviet leaders, Hawatmah undertook a peacemaking mission among Somalia, Ethiopia and the PDRY as well as in the conflict between the Ethiopian Government and Eritrean secessionists in June and July 1977.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The DFLP provided commandos and weapons specialists to assist the Libyan Army in its conflict with Egypt in the summer of 1977.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) The DFLP has good working relations with Persian Gulf leftists and provides them needed services such as placing declarations in the Lebanese press, offering office space at Al Hurriyah, disseminating propaganda throughout the Arab world, and soliciting financial and material aid.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) Friendly relations were established between the DFLP and PDRY when Hawatmah assisted that country's leaders in 1967. He has often mediated disputes and helped solve PDRY political problems. In return, the DFLP is afforded use of the PDRY diplomatic pouch for communications between regional branches and provided with alias passports.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) The DFLP trained instructors for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) in July 1973.

(U) At the instigation of the Soviet Union, the DFLP representatives met with anti-Zionist, Communist, Israeli Jews in Eastern Europe.

(U) Hawatmah has close ties with members of Iranian Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's entourage and attempted to bring the revolutionary/religious leader's movement closer to the Tudeh (Communist) Party. DFLP cells collected money in Khomeini's name among Shi'i migrant workers in countries on the Arab of the Gulf.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) Turkish guerrillas attended DFLP courses taught by Chinese and North Koreans.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The DFLP has working relations with the Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) which supported DFLP administrative activities in Cyprus during the worst stages of the war in Lebanon.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The DFLP has relations with the Spanish Labor Party.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) With entree assured by Lebanese Communist Party cohorts, the DFLP developed good working relations with the main body of the French left, especially with the Communist and Socialist party leaderships. After the onset of the war in Lebanon, French Communists provided medical and financial assistance and spread DFLP propaganda in France.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Formal contacts for political coordination were made with the Communist Party of Italy (PCI). Since the DFLP rank and file advocate a more orthodox Marxist-Leninist position than the PCI, however, there is little branch level cooperation between the two groups.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Contacts also exist with the Swiss Labor Party.

(C) At DFLP's initiative, a West German Near East Committee was established in Cologne in early 1976. Correspondence for the Committee is transacted by the Communist League of West Germany (KBW).

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) East Germany provides money, training and political aid of an unspecified nature.

(U) In early 1976, liaison was established with the Popular Front for the liberation of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio do Oro (POLISARIO Front), based in Algeria with nationalist goals in Western Sahara. The DFLP maintains good relations with the POLISARIO and expressed its hopes for even closer PLO-POLISARIO ties.

(U) Friendship with Cuba blossomed with high level contacts and aid, some of which were mentioned above. Cuba apparently facilitated DFLP communication with the Nicaraguan Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the two organizations voiced mutual support.

Event analysis:

(U) The 1974 massive hostage-taking incident at Ma'alot is considered a hallmark DFLP operation, one that the group would dearly like to repeat. In early 1979, a similar effort at Ma'alot, involving the same small number of

terrorists (3), bearing light arms and handgrenades, was repulsed by Israeli Defense Force sentries. As all Palestinian groups seek to step up their legitimate armed struggle, prompted by the exclusive Egyptian-Israeli peace efforts, additional DFLP attempts at spectacular exploits may be expected.

Significant activities:

(U) The highlights of 1974 have not been surpassed because DFLP terrorists have been unable to surmount the obstacle posed by Israeli and Jordanian security forces. Instead, therefore, the DFLP frequently takes the safer operational route of planting bombs in public locations.

May 1974 - (U) Perpetrated schoolhouse takeover and massacre in Ma'alot, Israel. Three terrorists, dressed in uniforms resembling those of the Israeli Defense Force and speaking Hebrew, infiltrated Israel via the Lebanese border. They attacked a van transporting women from Haifa, killing two and wounding six. On arrival at Ma'alot, they entered an apartment, killed three people and then seized a school building where a party of Israeli teenagers was spending the night. Some children escaped by jumping through windows; but 86 were held hostage. The terrorists, armed with guns and grenades, said that they would kill the children unless the Israeli authorities freed 20 to 23 Arab terrorists held in Israeli jails and gave them safe passage to Damascus. The French and Romanian Ambassadors were to serve as intermediaries and guarantors of the perpetrators' safe passage. The Ambassadors were brought to Ma'alot. The Israeli authorities announced that, to save the children, they would comply with demands. As the deadline approached, however, considerable confusion arose about the delivery of a code word. There appeared to be insufficient time to fly the prisoners to Damascus and relay the code word signaling their arrival before the terrorists' deadline. Although it was impossible to tell who fired first, Israeli soldiers, who had been surrounding the building, stormed it, but not before the terrorists turned their weapons on the children, leaving 16 dead and 70 wounded. Others died later. The terrorists were apparently killed when their explosives caught fire in the exchange of gunfire. One member of the assault force was also killed.

November 1974 - (U) Attacked Bet She'an settlement in Israel. Three terrorists, armed with handgrenades and Kalashnikov rifles and carrying leaflets in Hebrew demanding the release of 15 Palestinians, including Archbishop Capucci, from Israeli jails, perpetrated the attack. In 3 hours of carnage, they killed 4 and wounded 23, including 7 children. The terrorists took no hostages, barricaded themselves in an apartment building which the police cordoned off and continued to fire until a special mechanized army unit arrived. While the police drew the fire, soldiers ran upstairs and burst into the apartment, killing the three gunmen.

August 1976 - (U) DFLP member involved in plot to assassinate former PDRY Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Haytham in Cairo.

July 1977 - (U) Exploded pipe bomb in vegetable market in Petah Tiqva, suburb of Tel Aviv, killing 1, injuring 20.

- (U) Implicated in bombing at Beersheva Municipal Market, wounding 28.

- (U) Implicated in other bombings in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

December 1977 - (U) Planted bomb on main shopping street in Netanya; two killed, two injured.

November 1978 - (U) Claimed responsibility for bombing a supermarket in the Qiryat Arba Jewish settlement near Hebron on the West Bank, no casualties.

- (U) Accused Jordanian troops of killing one of its members and wounding another in the northern Jordan Valley as they attempted to cross into the West Bank to perpetrate an operation.

January 1979 - (C/NOFORN) Attempted to seize 230 civilians at a guest house in Ma'alot. Three terrorists, armed with Kalashnikov rifles and handgrenades, were intercepted and killed by a routine Israeli Defense Force patrol. One Israeli woman died and three were injured when they jumped from the building, seeking to escape.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Executive Summary

(U) Fervently Marxist, the PFLP seeks revolution in the Palestinian movement as a precursor to revolution in Arab states. A founder of the Rejection Front, the PFLP refused to compromise on the liberation of the entire Palestinian homeland (British Mandate) or on the destruction of Israel. In late 1978-79, however, PFLP leaders have begun to verbalize a more gradualist militancy, taking note of the need to establish the bases or conditions for armed struggle before a war can be launched.

(U) The PFLP was the first Palestinian group to undertake international terrorist operations. From 1970-77, under the aegis of Wadi Haddad, a master terrorism planner, and in collaboration with foreign terrorists, the PFLP carried out numerous, successful hijackings and hostage-taking actions for clearly stated, rejectionist, anti-Israeli political goals. Since Haddad's death, PFLP international terrorist operations have been less sophisticated and it has concentrated more on activities in Israel and the occupied territories.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The PFLP has about 1,000 members and a Communist party-type of organizational structure. Specialized terrorist training programs were offered in Iraq and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and military instruction obtained from China, Cuba, and North Korea. The group's arsenal includes artillery, rockets, SA-7 missiles, machineguns and explosives.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Orientation/Goals:

(U) Fervently Marxist, the PFLP advocates a revolution in the Palestinian movement as a prelude to Marxist revolutions in Arab states. Continuous revolutionary violence at all levels is considered the only way to maintain the existence of the Palestinian cause, free the entire Palestinian homeland (British Mandate), destroy Israel, and establish a democratic state and society in its ruins. International terrorism is part of a war of national liberation.

(U) As a founder of the Rejection Front in 1974, the PFLP rejected the "capitulationist" PLO position amenable to an interim, limited Palestinian entity on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 1977, however, various PFLP leaders admitted that they would welcome the establishment of a Palestinian authority over any part of Palestine--as a base to struggle against Israel.

(U) All peace initiatives are aimed at achieving Israel's secure and recognized borders; therefore the PFLP opposes them and calls for greater unity to face the threat posed to the Palestinian revolution by the Sadat overture. At the Tripoli Steadfastness and Confrontation Front Summit in December 1977, the Rejection Front policy of no negotiations, no recognition of Israel, and no acceptance of UN Resolution 242 was accepted by all Palestinian groups.

(U) Although Rejection Front groups, including the PFLP, had said that they would not rejoin PLO fora until steadfastness planks were incorporated into the Palestinian national program by the Palestine National Council (PNC), they all attended the January 1979 PNC session whose achievements fell short of their goal. While expressing disappointment with particular PNC results, however, the PFLP generally praised the "unity" evinced by the Palestinian movement.

(U) This moderate reaction to the PNC session seems an integral part of a more gradualist PFLP orientation or strategic concept now being defined by PFLP leader George Habash. He calls for the PLO to join Syria and Iraq in a program of full mass mobilization and confrontation with the Zionist enemy in all sectors--political, economic and cultural. But he declares, however, that this does not imply a mere act of grouping military forces in a quick manner to launch an immediate war. "We believe that such a war would not be in the interests of the Arabs by virtue of Israel's great military capability. The essence of this initiative is that it will draw up a sound confrontation program." Habash underscores the need to provide the bases, conditions and requirements for a strategic and revolutionary confrontation. This emerging, longterm, view is closer to the PLO mainstream than the PFLP has been in several years.

(U) Other obdurate PFLP policy attitudes have not changed. The gr attacks cooperation with United Nations Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) inhibiting access to the battlefront. It opposes the dialog with Jord because King Hussein refuses to permit the restoration of the Palestini revolution on and operation from Jordanian soil and labels his rejection of Camp David frameworks "a smokescreen." And, after Camp David, the PF declared that the present American leadrship will pay a heavy price for hav plotted against the Palestinian people and cause and vowed to strike at interests everywhere and at all levels.

Estimated strength:

(U) 1,000.

(C/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) PFLP-SO (Special Operations, aka A Assab-Revenge): 100.

Principal leaders:

(U) George Habash (Abu Hakim). Born in 1926, Lod, Palestine.

(U) Habash founded the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) at the A University of Beirut during the late 1940s. Originally pan-Arabist, organization became increasingly leftist and preoccupied with Palestin concerns. In 1967, Habash founded the PFLP. In 1968, he was jailed Damascus partly because of ideological disagreements between ANM and Ba'thi ideology. He escaped in a daring operation, planned by his close associat Wadi Haddad, when commandos stormed a jeep transporting him to court fo interrogation. Habash did not set foot in Syria until a Steadfastness an Confrontation Front summit in September 1978, at which time he also had personal talk with Syrian President Asad.

(U) In 1972, Habash suffered a massive heart attack which removed hi from the scene for about a year, during which he received medical treatment the Soviet Union and recuperated in Bulgaria. He reemerged in March 1973 wit a new, seemingly more effective, but temporary, call for unity and coordinat in the Palestinian movement. After the October War, he rejected a negotiat Middle East settlement and called for a continued war of popular liberation prevent the reestablishment of US influence in the Arab world through pol ical denouement. His intractability on the question of a settlement pla him at loggerheads with the Soviet Union in the summer of 1974. Some rec ciliation was achieved during one of his periodic health treatments in Mos which probably also dealt with politics. In November 1978, he visited Soviet Union for the first time in 2 years at the invitation of the Afro-As People's Solidarity Organization; but he did not meet with any high rank officials. Habash allegedly agreed to moderate his Marxism in order to obta Libyan aid.

(U) A charismatic personality and brilliant orator in a world where the spoken word is a vehicle of power, Habash is a powerful Palestinian leader. During many interviews and speeches after the Sadat initiative, his apparent vigor was noted. An infrequent traveler, Habash personally attended all Steadfastness Summits, journeyed to Cuba in April 1978 and to Moscow as noted. His health appears stable.

(U) Muhammad Taysir Quba. Born in 1938 in Qalqilya.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Quba joined the PFLP in 1967. In the same year, he was arrested and imprisoned by Israel and not released for 3 years. In 1972, Quba cooperated with Wadi Haddad, the late PFLP terrorism mastermind, in planning operations. At one time, he was believed to have been responsible for PFLP student affairs. He is now a member of the Politburo and director of the Foreign Operations Committee, in charge of PFLP's overseas infrastructure. Quba travels to Iraq frequently, went to Cuba with Habash in April 1978 and to Moscow in November 1978.

Background:

(U) In 1967, the Arab Nationalist Movement's Popular Liberation Front, the Heroes of the Return and the Young Avengers aggregated to form the PFLP which, by 1970, became the first Palestinian international terrorist group.

(FOUO) After the October 1973 War, the PFLP called for continued mobilization and armed resistance of all Palestinians. In September 1974, it "suspended" it membership on the PLO Executive Committee and became a leading member of the Rejection Front. In 1975-76, it sought complete victory in Lebanon and joined Fatah in aiding the Lebanese National Movement. The PFLP demanded Sa'iqa's expulsion from the PLO because of that organization's collusion with Syria and vilified Syria's role in Lebanon. Despite its tacit acquiescence to the Shtawrah Agreement of July 1977, the PFLP affirms the need to keep the Palestinian rifle in south Lebanon, opposed the introduction of UNIFIL troops in the south and targeted them when infiltration routes were threatened.

(U) After the Sadat initiative, the PFLP began solidarity efforts, attending summits and holding bilateral talks with PLO and Arab leaders. In December 1977, Arafat was present at the group's tenth anniversary celebration, making laudatory remarks and marking the first time in 5 years that Habash and Arafat shared a platform. As a result of the March 1978 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, PFLP relations with Syria also improved. The PFLP has entreated Syria to lead the anti-Israel bloc and supports the Syrian-Iraqi accommodation, following the lead of its Iraqi benefactors.

(U) Intra-Palestinian unity appears an unattainable goal. A signator of the May 1978 memorandum advocating democratic and collective decisionmaking

in the PLO, the PFLP disapproved of Arafat's use of force within Fatah and against rejectionist groups and blew up its own office at Al Baddawi rather than let Fatah capture it. Deploring all internecine bloodshed, the PFLP attempted to mediate the Fatah-Iraq feud, ended through Algeria's good offices. The PFLP has moved closer to Fatah's erstwhile allies, the DFLP and Sa'iqa, and seems to be developing an anti-Fatah (or anti-Arafat) bloc within the PLO. Fatah's uncompromising stand on PLO Executive Committee composition at the January 1979 PNC session is an indication of awareness of the threat such a bloc can pose to its domination of the PLO.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) PFLP commandos were recruited by Libya to aid in its conflict with Egypt in the summer of 1977.

(U) Due to its diverse ideological, strategic and tactical leadership and internal disputes over the years, the PFLP has spawned several other Palestinian groups and influenced other Arab liberation movements. Among these are the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the National Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (NF/PDRY), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) and the Kuwaiti-Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM-K).

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) For many years, Wadi Haddad was master planner of PFLP terrorist actions. He died on 28 March 1978, reportedly cancer and in East Germany. Periodically, Haddad had been rumored to [illegible] leading a breakaway group such as the 1973-74 Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine with independent funding from Libya. In December 1974, Habash allegedly ordered the suspension of international terrorist activities to save assets and avoid anti-Rejection Front action by other PLO organizations. After the October 1977 Mogadiscio operation, the PFLP claimed that Haddad had been expelled by its Central Committee in February 19[illegible] because of his defiance of the antiterrorism decision. Between 1976 and 197[illegible] numerous reports of a Haddad-Habash rift or strained relationship were published. Haddad's ties to the PFLP, if any, were loose. He had his own cadre of terrorists from a variety of nations which was labeled the PFLP-SO (Special Operations). His joint use of foreigners and Palestinians was epitomized by the exploits of "Carlos" (Il'ich Ramirez Sanchez). Incidents perpetrated by the Arab Nationalist Youth (noted above), the Lebanese Revolutionary Guard, the Sons of the Occupied Territory, the Commando Mohammed Boudia Group, the Arm of the Arab Revolution, and the Organization of Struggle Against World Imperialism, were probably actions planned by Haddad. At no time, however, were confirmed or reliable reports received to prove that Haddad was leading a group completely severed from the PFLP. On the contrary, Haddad met with PFLP leaders and may have been supported by the PFLP rank and file. After Haddad's death and in view of the Sadat initiative and the impasse in south Lebanon, attempts were made to reintegrate Haddad's followers into the PFLP which is, reportedly, once again, assents to foreign operations. No two reports name the same person as Haddad's successor.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In Iraq, Haddad reportedly had close ties to the Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP) and to Sabri al Banna of the Black June Organization (BJO).

Tactics/Methods of operation:

(U) The PFLP (Haddad) favored extraordinarily well-planned exploits at an infinite variety of international locations, with the participation of operatives of many nationalities. Dramatic PFLP-perpetrated incidents include many hijackings, mass kidnapings, bombings and assassinations.

(C/NOFORN) The attempted assault on El Al passengers at Orly Airport in May 1978 was the first PFLP operation after Haddad's death and lacked his finesse. A single unconfirmed report alleged that the incident was planned as a suicide mission and intended to dispose of US Ambassador to Lebanon Meloy's assassin.

(U) After Camp David, the PFLP vowed to increase its activities in Israel and the occupied territories and "deal a counterblow to Zionist projects." No exceptional escalation has been noted, however, in the number of bombings in which the PFLP has been implicated.

Organization:

(U) A party structure similar to that of the Soviet Communist Party is headed by a central committee with cells at the base. Functional departments deal with operation, propaganda, administration and fundraising.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The Israelis report that a PFLP military arm coordinates terrorist operations both overseas and inside Israel from Beirut.

Headquarters/Bases:

(C) Headquartered in Beirut, the PFLP has offices and exerts influence at the 'Ayn al Hilwah, Ba'labakk, Burj al Barajinah, Shatila, Nahr al Barid and Al Baddawi refugee camps. It also has strong support in Gaza strip refugee camps and cells there, on the West Bank and in Jordan--all underground. Branches exist in 17 Arab countries.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Before the Israeli invasion of south Lebanon, the PFLP exercised control over a considerable portion of southeastern south Lebanon. Despite a retreat in the face of the Israelis, the PFLP was reestablished in the Barish area south of the Litani River by June 1978 and was actively attempting to reinfiltrate the border region.

(U) In January 1979, the PFLP opened an office in Damascus.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The PFLP has a base in Aden, PDRY, and training facilities in Iraq. Prior to the November 1977 Mogadiscio incident, the PFLP also had facilities in Somalia.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In May 1977, Fatah ceded control over two training camps in Libya to the PFLP: one in Khums, east of Tripoli, and one between Janzur and Zawiyah, west of Tripoli. PFLP also has a training site at R'as al Hilal, Libya.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Wadi Haddad had his own facility at the Camp of Revolution, north of Baghdad, near Al Mansur, Iraq, where foreigners in his employ were situated and processed. Reconciliation meetings between Habash and Haddad followers reportedly took place in Iraq. Haddad also frequently used terrorist camps in the PDRY and Libya, where special programs for foreigners may exist.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) It has been suggested that an as yet unmonitored, secret PFLP cell in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, may have been responsible for the September 1977 bombing of an Egyptian Airlines office there. Palestinians have been arrested while attempting to smuggle explosives into Saudi Arabia. The Saudis assume that these individuals are Rejection Front or PFLP operatives or mercenaries.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In January 1977, the PFLP used Cyprus as a transfer point for donations, equipment, food, weapons and volunteers. Although such use has declined, it has not ceased.

(C) The Algerian Embassy in Brussels allegedly is supporting PFLP cells in that city and in The Hague, Munich and Rome.

Training:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Aside from commando training in refugee camps, the PFLP uses homes and villages in Lebanon on an ad hoc basis. Before the war in Lebanon, the Ba'labakk camp had joint PFLP-Japanese Red Army (JRA) training programs. The PFLP curriculum includes hand-to-hand combat, street fighting, and use of explosives and personal weapons.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) PFLP operatives are trained in various Arab countries, noted above, as well as abroad. In November 1976, PFLP members departed for military and foreign language instruction in China. North Korea has provided training, too.

(C/NOFORN) During Habash's April 1978 visit to Havana, Cuba agreed to provide specialized training for 200 PFLP cadre in Cuba or a third country.

In addition, a small contingent of not more than 10 Cubans served as PFLP instructors in Lebanon in the spring of 1978.

Weapons:

(S) Before the March 1978 Israeli invasion, the PFLP weapons depot in Tyre was reportedly the largest in south Lebanon. (The PFLP shared ownership with the Lebanese Communist Action Organization.) This site contained Soviet "Grad" rockets, modified Malutka rockets, 120-mm and 155-mm artillery, 60-mm, 81-mm and 82-mm mortars, 72-mm and 106 mm recoilless refles, .50-caliber machineguns, Degtyarev medium machineguns, East German Kalashnikov rifles that fire Energa grenades, RPG B-7 rocket launchers, other machineguns, pistols, ammunition, and trucks. In the early months of 1978, Iraq engaged in large buildup of PFLP supplies. The Tyre depot may be indicative.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Iraq and Libya are the main PFLP arms suppliers. When Iraqi forces departed from Lebanon in January 1978, they gave the PFLP 18 tons of rockets and light and heavy weapons. Libya also supplies quantities; it shipped heavy weapons and secured 20,000 American M-16 rifles for the Rejection Front. On a different level of action, international terrorism, the weapons used in the 20 May 1978 Orly Airport attack had been purchased by the Libyan Armed Forces Directorate in 1975.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In other terrorist operations, the PFLP used plastique explosives and homemade bombs with complex timing mechanisms.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) In August 1978, a Jordanian PFLP member was killed in an Athens suburb. His apartment contained 200 kilos of explosives. Additional explosives and weapons, including an SA-7 missile, were found in his associates' residence.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Algeria may have supplied trucks, landrovers, and armored personnel carriers as well as weapons and ammunition.

(C/NOFORN) Cuba delivers large quantities of sugar to Syria with repayment scheduled in Syrian manufactured small arms ammunition destined for the PFLP.

(U) The Israelis contend that the PFLP has a central supply system for phony documents such as passports, visas and driving licenses.

Finances:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Libya is considered the major cash contributor to the PFLP. Since the formation of the Rejection Front, it has given large lump-sum payments. In 1977, regular $310,000 Libyan donation, for unspecified periods, were bestowed. The most infamous Libyan allocation was

$10 million just prior to the OPEC operation in 1975. As of September 1976, the Iraqi monthly subsidy to the PFLP was $202,600. A separate newspaper subsidy and individual stipends for Habash and Haddad were also provided by Iraq. The Iraqi Embassy in Beirut supplied some exceptional operating expenses to PFLP forces during the war in Lebanon. In the fall of 1977, however, relations between the PFLP and the Iraqi Government appeared strained. The PFLP complained about insufficient financial support and a refusal by Iraq to increase its subsidy. Increased reliance on Libya, and perhaps Algeria, seemed probable.

International connections:

(U) PFLP branches in many nations, founding ties to liberation groups, training, weapons and financial aid have been noted.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Leaders of the PDRY regard Habash as an ideological and organizational mentor and call upon him for political advice and to mediate domestic conflicts. In return they provide diplomatic cover, sanctuary and other basic assistance for the PFLP, its foreign allies and operatives. After a 1973 hijacking, Habash gave the PDRY a portion of the ransom in exchange for a free hand in using the PDRY for sanctuary and training. Although in August 1976 Haddad's actions reportedly were restricted, those restraints did not apply to the PFLP in general. Nevertheless, Libya superseded the PDRY as the major PFLP patron in terms of training and sanctuary. No indication of any change in PDRY-PFLP relations was observed in the aftermath of the June 1978 leadership changes in Yemen.

(U) Syrian-PFLP conflicts during the war in Lebanon were noted. Syria's new willingness to deal with all Palestinian factions functioning in Lebanon, including the PFLP, resulted from the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Sadat initiative. While a basic mutual distrust is probably ineradicable, increased pragmatism is redounding to the PFLP's benefit in various support areas mentioned.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Kuwait University Political Science Department members may be PFLP Persian Gulf leaders; while leaders of the Palestinian Students Union in Kuwait are PFLP members. The PFLP stores records and correspondence in Al Tali'a Kuwaiti newspaper offices. Expulsions of Palestinians by the Kuwait Government in the fall of 1978 threatened the core of PFLP leadership in the country. Members mobilized to circulate handbills critical of the deportation policy. Regime suspicions and restrictions also hinder PFLP organizational activities.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) A small number of PFLP adherents remain underground and quiescent in Bahrain with possible ties to the PFLP/Bahrain, National Liberation Front/Bahrain and various Bahraini pro-Iraq elements.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The PFLP has cells in West Berlin, Munich, Wuppertal and Duesseldorf, West Germany. PFLP propaganda is printed by the Iraqi Embassy in Bonn.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The PFLP also has operational and support ties to German terrorist groups. In 1970, Baader-Meinhof Group (B-MG) elements received weapons training from the PFLP in the Middle East. Later, the B-MG supplied false identification papers for foreign PFLP operatives. PFLP (Haddad) perpetrated the October 1977 Lufthansa hijacking to support B-MG/RAF (Red Army Faction) kidnaping demands being made in West Germany. In December 1977, Joerg Lang, a reputed leader of the B-MG/RAF (Haag generation), traveled from Beirut to Libya in the company of a PFLP official. Adherents of B-MG/RAF offshoots have been trained by the PFLP in the PDRY.

(U) Germans form the largest foreign contingent to receive training from the PFLP.

(C) Other West German "new left" elements travel to Lebanon to talk with Palestinian refugees and be briefed by PFLP commandos. The Maoist Union of Revolutionary Arab Workers in West Berlin maintains contacts with the PFLP. The 2d of June Movement directly contacted Habash to arrange hiding places in Oman, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon or the PDRY. It allegedly paid for asylum in the last location. PFLP members intended to join various German religious-social groups--such as the Arab-Islamic Welfare Society, the Islamic Association of Germany, and the Arab Relief Association of Neu-Isenburg--to obtain platforms. German terrorists participated in PFLP operations such as the OPEC attack and the hijacking that ended at Entebbe.

(U) Irish Republican Army militants trained with the PFLP in Jordanian camps in 1968 and 1969, and the PFLP sent delegates to a Dublin conference of guerrilla groups in May 1972. Informal relations are probably still maintained.

(U) Israeli radio reports that the Spanish Warriors of Christ the King, a rightwing (neo-Nazi?) group, is training PFLP cadre.

(U) In 1969, Front for the Liberation of Quebec members trained with the PFLP.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Latin American contacts and organizations are assiduously cultivated. In April 1974, the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) reportedly had close ties with Palestinians, possible from the PFLP, in West Germany who bought arms for ERP. Relations between the PFLP and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) of Chile (now primarily in Argentina) have been marked by mutual assistance in the procurement of Chilean and Peruvian passports and instruction of MIR members by PFLP. Several years ago, the Latin America Revolutionary Committee (LARC), based in Paris, funded

by West Germans, with Brazilian and other exile Latin American members, gave PFLP clandestine support. Latin Americans participated in PFLP-directed terrorist attacks abroad and in the collection of tactical intelligence. Palestinian and Arab communities in various Latin American countries support the PFLP.

(U) In April 1978, Habash visited Cuba in response to an official invitation by the Cuban Government. After the visit, a communique, affirming Cuban support for the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle, was issued. This marked the first time that a Socialist/Communist nation committed itself to radical Palestinian goals. Tangible Cuban support is noted under various subsections above.

(U) For many years, the PFLP strongly supported the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and may have trained some of its members. On 30 April 1978, however, an ELF/Popular Liberation Forces spokesman accused the PFLP of attempting to provoke dissension in its ranks in order to curry favor with the Ethiopian regime. The PFLP continues to have cordial relations with other Eritrean factions, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the ELF/Revolutionary Council.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In March 1978, a Chadian descendant of Palestinians, involved with the PFLP since 1970, reportedly was planning to establish an operational base in the Tibesti Mountains with Libyan support.

(C/NOFORN) Ties with Japanese leftist groups are strong. Since 1974, the Japanese Surging Wave Faction Communist League and the International Revolution Front Information Center have aided the PFLP. The Palestinian People's Support Center in Tokyo offers propaganda assistance and relief--food, funds and clothing. In the fall of 1978, a tour of 16 Japanese, many suspected of being JRA sympathizers, visited refugee facilities and guerrilla camps in Lebanon. Affiliates of the Santama Palestine Solidarity Society passed a message to the PFLP. In January 1979, the leftist Japanese People's Newspaper published a PFLP request for "reports, leaflets and various struggles being conducted in Japan"; responses included publications of about 30 Japanese groups.

(C) Since 1971, the PFLP has enjoyed a very close relationship with the Japanese Red Army. At one point, the JRA may have been considered the PFLP's nurtured offspring with a separate existence. A full narrative concerning the JRA and its PFLP connection is in the Asian volume of the compendium.

(C) Il'ich Ramirez Sanchez (aka Carlos Martinez), a Venezuelan who studied in the Soviet Union, was recruited by the PFLP in 1971. He subsequently acted in a liaison capacity with European terrorist groups and operated a PFLP terrorist cell in Paris. The groups in contact with him were the Irish Republican Army, the Japanese Red Army, remnants of the Baader-Meinhof Group, leaders of the 2d of June Movement, as well as Turkish radicals, Cuban intelligence agents and Latin Americans.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Carlos' guidance, intelligence, operational planning, weapons, documents, travel and other funds, shelter, etc., probably were provided initially by the Haddad wing of the PFLP. As of 8 January 1977, Carlos was based Tripoli under the direct patronage of Mu'ammar Qadhfi. His most frequent contacts are still with the Libyan intelligence service. In November 1978, he traveled to Iraq where he reportedly was successful in recruiting two Haddad followers. In January 1979, he was in Malta. His extensive international connections are maintained.

(U) Media reports suggest that Carlos underwent extensive plastic surgery which changed his features drastically.

Event analysis:

(U) Under Haddad's direction, PFLP operations were invariably well-planned and had clearly stated, political motivations. Common aims were to coerce pro-Israeli foreign governments to change their policies or to force moderate Arab nations to become more rejectionist. Several incidents were perpetrated to gain the release of imprisoned cohorts or allies--diverse European or Japanese terrorists who had not necessarily participated in PFLP actions, although Haddad favored the use of foreigners, and Palestinians. Airlines were most frequent targets--for hijackings, massacres in airport lounges, or attacks against planes in flight. During hijackings, perpetrators threatened to blow up the planes, held an extraordinarily large number of hostages, and sometimes exchanged hostages for airline officers or diplomats. In some instances, operations ended with terrorists obtaining safe passage, haven or freedom in Arab countries.

(U) Although the PFLP no longer undertakes hijackings, it still functions on an international scale. Violent effects, however, seem even more random and goals either less explicit or more diffuse. Since his death, the allegiance of Haddad's closest operational colleagues is mostly unknown. If they remain an intrinsic part of the PFLP, then the group probably retains its devastating potential and recent incidents might be considered transitional. If not, then a new, possibly very active, Palestinian or international terrorist organization could conceivably emerge from their ranks.

Significant activities:

(U) From 1970 until 1977, the PFLP was probably responsible for more airplane hijackings than any other international terrorist group. Their complexity is detailed below. Since Haddad's illness and death, no comparable PFLP feats have been accomplished.

1971 - (U) Coordinated hijacking and subsequent destruction of four European and US planes in Jordan. Terrorists held 300 hostages and demanded the release of Arab terrorists from Swiss, British and West German prisons. Some prisoners were released after the hostages were freed.

PFLP

1971 - (S/NOFORN) Attacked Israeli tanker Coral Sea.

May 1972 - (U) Planned Lod Airport (Israel) massacre, perpetrated by JRA, which resulted in 25 killed and 76 wounded.

April 1973 - (U) Attacked home of Israeli Ambassador and an Israeli plane, both in Nicosia, Cyprus.

July 1973 - (U) With JRA, hijacked a Japan Air Lines 747 to Dubai and destroyed it 4 days later. Five terrorists--a Latin American woman, three Arabs and one Japanese--hijacked the plane with 137 passengers and crew aboard. After 3 days of negotiations, the plane was flown to Libya and permitted to land after the terrorists threatened to blow it up in midair. After all of the passengers and crew members were evacuated (and later released), the plane was blown up. Neither motives nor actual demands were immediately revealed. Later, however, JAL acknowledged that it had received a note demanding 30 million yen and the release of two JRA members from Japanese prisons. The company lacked sufficient time to accommodate the demands before the plane was destroyed.

August 1973 - (U) Committed Athens Airport massacre. Two terrorists, hurling grenades and firing machineguns, killed three persons, two of them Americans, and wounded 55 in a crowded transit lounge at Athens Airport. The perpetrators then seized 35 hostages and held them at gunpoint for 2 hours before surrendering to police.

November 1973 - (U) Hijacked a KLM 747 en route from Amsterdam to Tokyo with 271 passengers and crew aboard. The terrorists demanded that the Dutch Government change its pro-Israel stance and no longer aid the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. They threatened to blow up the plane and all aboard unless their demands were met. Several refueling stops were made, and some Middle East countries refused to give the hijackers permission to land. During a stopover in Nicosia, Cyprus, the terrorists sent a note to President Makarios demanding that he free seven jailed comrades, but the plane took off again before any move was made to release the men. After 2 days, in Malta, the passengers and stewardesses were released. A KLM vice president and the Egyptian Charge d'Affaires on the island became hostages instead. The hijackers finally surrendered themselves and their remaining hostages after receiving a safe-passage guarantee in Dubai.

December 1973 - (U) Perpetrated Fiumicino Airport (Rome) massacre. Five terrorists took weapons from their luggage and began firing in the transit lounge at the airport. Taking Italian policemen as prisoners, they ran toward a Pan American Airways jetliner which was preparing to take off for Beirut. They hurled incendiary bombs inside the plane and killed 30 persons,

PFLP

including many Americans and four Moroccan officials. A policeman was killed when he attempted to prevent the terrorists from commandeering a Lufthansa plane. Twelve hostages were gathered en route to the plane which was hijacked. After Beirut refused permission to land, the jet headed for Athens. For 14 hours the hijackers negotiated with Greek authorities for the release of two comrades who had perpetrated the August massacre and for the exchange of their hostages for Arab diplomats. As deadlines passed, the hijackers claimed to have killed some of the hostages; the claims later proved false. The plane next stopped at Damascus for food, fuel, and maps. Syrian officials could not persuade the terrorists to free their captives. Finally, despite Kuwaiti attempts to block the runway, the aircraft landed in Kuwait where the terrorists freed the hostages and surrendered.

January -

February 1974 - (U) Responsible (with JRA) for bombing, hijacking, kidnaping exploit, Singapore to Kuwait. Two Japanese and two Arabs hired a boat to take them fishing in Singapore Harbor. As they approached an island on which a Shell oil refinery and storage complex is situated, one of the terrorists clubbed the boatman. Before they could reach the island, however, the boat ran aground on a rock. A passing ferryboat unwittingly came to their assistance, carrying them until they could jump ashore and set plastic charges to oil tanks. One tank was set ablaze and small holes were ripped into two others. The terrorists then ran to a pier and forcibly seized another ferryboat with five crewmen. Singapore Government gunboats rapidly surrounded them. The culprits demanded safe passage to an Arab state, with arrangements to be made by the Japanese Ambassador, who they requested accompany them wherever they went, along with one other Japanese official, in place of the hostage crewmen. Japanese and Singapore officials agreed to the request because there had been loss of life. While these arrangements were being made in the Orient, five other terrorists seized the Japanese Ambassador to Kuwait and several members of his staff at gunpoint. They demanded that their four comrades in Singapore be flown to Kuwait on a Japanese airliner. The Kuwaiti Government offered the terrorists on their soil safe conduct if they released the hostages, but refused to allow any Japanese aircraft to land in Kuwait. The Japanese Government, on the other hand, announced its willingness to comply with the demand. Presenting the Kuwaitis with a fait accompli, the Japanese sent a plane to Singapore and, upon the release of hostages there, transported the four terrorists to Kuwait. Permission to land was reluctantly given after the Kuwaiti hostages were also released. The nine terrorists immediately flew to Aden, which granted them permission to leave freely whenever they desired.

March 1974 - (U) Hijacked a British jet en route from Bombay to London with 102 aboard and forced it to land in Amsterdam after Athens authorities refused permission to land there. Passengers and crew were permitted to flee and a fire was set. Dutch police captured the two terrorists, armed with

guns and handgrenades, in a runway chase. Only one warning shot was fired aboard the plane by the perpetrators throughout the entire incident and no one was hurt.

May 1974 - (U) Sabotaged Trans-Arabia Pipeline (Tapline).

August 1974 - (U) Bombed French pro-Israel publications and offices, Paris.

September 1974 - (S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) Sabotaged and destroyed a TWA jetliner in midflight, Ionian Sea.

December 1974 - (U) Using grenades, attacked a movie theater in Tel Aviv, killing two and wounding 38.

December 1975 - (U) Carried out the seizure and transport of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) ministers in Vienna to Tripoli (Libya) and Algiers. Six terrorists, with explosives and submachineguns concealed in sports equipment bags, began a 10-day incident when they entered the OPEC building and sprayed the corridor with bullets, killing an Austrian policeman and an Iraqi security guard. They then burst into the ministers meeting and took more than 60 hostages, including 11 official delegates. In a subsequent struggle, a Libyan oil official was killed. Through a woman hostage, the terrorists demanded: ropes, scissors and adhesive tape to bind their hostages; a bus with drawn curtains to take them to the airport the following morning, where a DC-9 aircraft should await them; and that the Libyan Ambassador to Austria be brought in to negotiate. Several hours later, the Venezuelan Minister of Mines was sent to get a radio. Still later, an Iraqi delegation member brought a demand for a radio broadcast. In the broadcast, the terrorists voiced political demands including: "the reaffirmation of the three principles of the Arab Summit of Khartoum--no negotiations, no agreements, and no recognition for the Zionist aggressor"; the rejection by OPEC member countries of "all compromises and political plans" that would be equivalent to recognition of Israel's existence; and a role for "the Arab people and other peoples of the Third World" in dealing with oil resources. Some 600 Austrian police surrounded the building, and negotiations were conducted with Austrian Chancellor Kreisky and Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika. As demanded, on the following morning the terrorists were bused to the airport. They retained custody of 41 hostages, including the ministers, and retrieved a wounded cohort with an Austrian doctor to care for him. The plane flew to Algiers where the ministers and delegates from Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Venezuela were released. The Algerian Oil Minister reboarded the plane as a gesture of solidarity with his colleagues. The plane then flew to Tripoli, where the Algerian and Libyan ministers and several other hostages got off. After being denied an aircraft with a longer range to take them to various Arab countries and being refused permission to

land in Baghdad and Tunis, the plane returned to Algiers where the last of the OPEC officials were released unharmed. It was reported the following week that the Algerian Government had granted the terrorists asylum as fighters for the Palestinian cause. Algerian sources said that the terrorists had negotiated their freedom with the Algerian Foreign Minister in exchange for the last of the hostages.

January 1976 - (U) Attempted missile attack on El Al airplane, Nairobi.

June 1976 - (S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) PFLP Lebanese affiliate implicated in kidnaping and murder of US Ambassador to Lebanon, his economic counselor and chauffeur.

June-July 1976 - (U) Hijacked an Air France plane en route from Tel Aviv to Paris and diverted it to Benghazi, Libya, and then to Entebbe Airport, outside Kampala, Uganda. Five terrorists, including two Germans, perpetrated the attack. Armed with handguns, submachineguns, and explosives, they took 257 hostages and demanded the release of 53 terrorists imprisoned in Israel, France, Kenya, Switzerland and West Germany, who were to be flown to Entebbe no later than 1 July. Once on the ground, the plane was met by two armed men who joined the terrorists. After several hours, the terrorists and hostages transferred from the plane to an old terminal building. Israelis and Jews of other nationalities were split off from the rest of the hostages. On 30 June, the hijackers released 47 women, children and sick people. The following day, after the Israeli Government announced a dramatic reversal of its nonnegotiation policy and agreed to parley the release of some terrorist prisoners for hostages, the terrorists' deadline was extended to 4 July, and about 100 additional hostages were freed. Israel's negotiations were conducted through the French Government which dealt with the Ugandans. The Somali Ambassador to Uganda, the senior diplomat on post, acted as the terrorists' representative. On 3-4 July, Israeli paratroops and elite infantrymen staged an early morning raid and rescued the hostages. At least seven of the terrorists were killed along with one Israeli soldier and three hostages. About 20 Ugandan soldiers fell in the Israeli assault and many others were wounded.

July 1976 - (S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Firebombed Syrian Airlines office Kuwait.

July-August 1976 - (S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Bombed international fair, major tourist hotel, and other sites, Damascus.

August 1976 - (U) Responsible for armed assault on El Al passengers at Yesilkoy Airport, Istanbul. Two perpetrators imprisoned with life sentences escaped from Turkish jail in January 1979.

September 1976 - (U) Hijacked a KLM aircraft in Europe, forced it to land in Tunis for refueling, and eventually put down in Cyprus. Three terrorists held 82 passengers and crew members and demanded the release of eight Palestinian prisoners by Israel. They threatened to blow up the plane unless their demand was met; but after 4 hours on the ground they surrendered and freed their hostages in return for a promise of safe conduct by Greek Cypriot authorities.

October 1977 - (U) Hijacked a Lufthansa jet en route from Majorca to Frankfurt, eventually forcing it to land in Mogadiscio, Somalia. Four terrorists, armed with guns, plastique explosives, and Makarov 9 mm ammunition, took 87 hostages. They demanded the release of 11 terrorists from West German prisons (the same list was proposed by kidnapers of Hanns Martin Schleyer in West Germany) and two PFLP cohorts from a Turkish jail; a ransom payment of $15 million; and a safe flight to an unspecified country. A deadline was set. Although contact with the hijackers was maintained by the authorities, no concessions were made and all deadlines passed without incident. A special German Federal Border Police unit of 61 men carried out a counterassault. Three terrorists were killed, one taken prisoner. Nine hostages were wounded, none killed. The pilot had been murdered by the terrorists prior to the assault. (Haddad faction)

December 1977 - (S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Implicated in bombing of Egypt Air office in Sharjah.

April 1978 - (C/NOFORN) Assassinated former Lebanese Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait who was a member of a powerful Shi'a family. Habash blamed another member of the family for the killing of a close associate during the Israeli incursion in March.

May 1978 - (U) Three terrorists, armed with machineguns and hand-grenades, opened fire on people waiting to board an El Al plane at Orly Airport, outside of Paris. Police returned fire. In the gun battle, the terrorists and one security man were killed; two French policemen, a stewardess and a passenger were wounded. Reportedly, the perpetrators had no hijacking plans; their purpose was to massacre the people.

August 1978 - (U) Four men, hurling grenades and firing bursts from automatic weapons, attacked a bus carrying 21 El Al personnel as it approached a London hotel. One Israeli stewardess was killed, two injured, seven British bystanders wounded, and one Palestinian terrorist killed by ricocheting fragments of his own grenade in the daylight operation. Two terrorists were captured and one escaped. (PFLP-SO)

November 1978 - (U) Bombed a bus near Jericho. One Belgian tourist and three Israelis were killed, and more than 30 injured, including five Swedes, three Canadians and two Americans when the device was thrown into the vehicle at stop. The perpetrator escaped in a waiting car.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC)

Executive Summary

(U) The PFLP-GC is essentially the creation and tool of one man, Ahmad Jibril, a respected Palestinian strategist, who has shifted the group's orientation markedly in recent years from independent anti-Israeli militancy to seemingly inextricable identification with Syrian policies. The PFLP-GC staunchly opposes the Sadat initiative and the entire Middle East peace process.

(C/NOFORN) Jibril's support of the Syrian incursion into Lebanon in 1976 against the Palestinian resistance movement provoked internal PFLP-GC warfare and a division of the group; dissident members formed the Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP). Since then, the group's strength and prestige have suffered. It now has about 200 to 300 members. Not organizationally sophisticated, the PFLP-GC depends on Syrian provision of Soviet-made weapons and on commando and pilot training by Libya. The latter is a constant benefactor due to Jibril's friendship with Mu'ammar Qadhafi.

(U) Responsible for several hijackings in 1968-69, the PFLP-GC perpetrated one devastating massacre in Israel in 1974. It has since been inactive on the terrorist scene and its present threat is dubious.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC)

Orientation/Goals:

(U) From 1968 until June 1976, the PFLP-GC steered clear of intra-guerrilla organizations, disavowed interference in the internal affairs of Arab states, refrained from ideology, and always and primarily advocated a radical, militant line against Israel. After a short-lived PLO/Executive Committee membership, the PFLP-GC became a stalwart member of the Rejection Front, refused to accept political solutions to the Middle East conflict, denounced Egyptian and Syrian disengagement accords, repudiated the PLO policy of a limited state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and called for the overthrow of rightwing Arab governments.

(U) In the aftermath of Syria's June 1976 incursion into Lebanon, the PFLP-GC split. The faction which supported Syrian action retained the name PFLP-GC and conformed to Syrian policies. At the Palestine National Council session in March 1977, the PFLP-GC voted for the Syrian-approved Palestine national program, establishing the creation of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip and participation in the Geneva Peace Conference as PLO goals. In May 1977, however, PFLP-GC leader Ahmad Jibril seemed to return to the rejectionist position when he opposed "capitulationist solutions and attempts to relinquish Arab lands." In September, he vowed to struggle until all of Palestine was liberated.

(U) The PFLP-GC was outraged by the Sadat peace initiative and opposes the entire process.

Estimated strength:

(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL) 200-300.

Principal leaders:

(U) Ahmad Jibril (Abu Jihad). Born 1936 in Ram Allah.

(U) Jibril's family left Palestine in 1948 and settled in Qunaytirah, Syria. At age 19, he joined the Syrian Army and eventually achieved the rank of captain in the engineering corps. Actively opposed to Syria's union with Egypt in the early 1960s, Jibril was detained for 3 years. In 1963 he was dismissed from the army for what he has called his "radical Palestinian and revolutionary socialist activities."

(U) Although Jibril claims to have formed his first commando group in 1959, he was not identified with a guerrilla command until 1964. In 1967, he merged his cadre with the PFLP. Because of personality differences with

…bash, the merger was short-lived and, in 1968, Jibril split to form the …neral Command.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Jibril was seriously wounded in the leg in …e fighting for the Beirut hotel district in April 1976. He recovered in …me to side with Syria after that nation's incursion into Lebanon in June …976. Others in the PFLP-GC, led by Muhammad al Abbas (Abu al Abbas), opposed …ibril's policy and, in September 1976, attempted to expel him from the PFLP-…C for collaborating with Syria against the Palestine resistance movement. …hen resulting internecine warfare was pacified, Jibril retained leadership …er a weakened PFLP-GC faction.

(U) Somewhat a man of mystery, Jibril changed his style in the fall of …977 when he began making more frequent public appearances, attending ral-…ies, and delivering fiery speeches.

(U) Jibril is considered one of the best military strategists in the …alestinian movement. He is respected by Arab leaders with military back-…rounds and enjoys an especially close relationship with Qadhafi of Libya. In …arly 1976, he was the first radical leader to visit the Soviet Union after …he formation of the Rejection Front.

…U) Talal Naji. Born in 1930.

(C) The assistant secretary general of the PFLP-GC, Naji became the …irst PFLP-GC representative on the PLO/Executive Committee in June 1974 and …as named to head the PLO Department of Higher Education.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) In October 1974, Naji was a member of the PLO …elegation to the Rabat Arab Summit, and in November 1974, he was part of a …ontingent visiting Moscow with PLO/EC Chairman Arafat.

(C) It has been suggested that Naji remained active on the Executive …ommittee during the years of the PFLP-GC alinement with the Rejection Front. …e may retain some personal, political independence because of his position as …n elder statesman of the Palestinian movement.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) When the PFLP-GC split in 1976, Naji sided …ith the pro-Syrian group joining Jibril and was appointed PFLP-GC spokesman. …n November 1976, Naji was part of a short-lived PFLP-GC interim command …ttempting unsuccessfully to reunite the organization.

(C) Naji is considered a Marxist.

…ckground:

(U) As noted, Jibril split from the PFLP to form the PFLP-GC in 1968. …ll of the group's early activities were directed against Israel.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The PFLP-GC was known for its superior m l tary expertise. It played a crucial role in the Lebanese National Movement 1975 and early 1976 phases of the war. Its strategists coordinated milit efforts, stirred up urban unrest, and constructively channeled Libyan in volvement.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Syria's June 1976 incursion into Leba had a disastrous effect on the PFLP-GC, pitting a faction alined with Jib against one in accord with Abu al Abbas. Battles raged between the factions. In April 1977, Yasir Arafat arranged for an official divisio the group into the PFLP-GC and the FLP (Front for the Liberation of Pa tine). Conflicts continued, however because Jibril, with the assistance As-Sa'iqa and Syrian Army Special Forces, attempted to regain total con over the PFLP-GC and FLP and all facilities in Lebanon, and Abu al Abbas his rejectionist allies opposed these efforts. An uncertain peace between parties emerged in the summer of 1977, but intermittent clashes still occu The most recent, over a naval position north of Tyre, took place in Septembe 1978.

(S) In June 1978, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) attacked the PFL office at the 'Ayn al Hilwah refugee camp. The battle was considered on the bloodier episodes of surrogate warfare fought between Iraqi and Syri protege organizations within the Palestinian movement.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) PFLP-GC commandos situated in Libya as well as specially deployed PFLP-GC weapons experts and pilots assisted Liby in its conflict with Egypt in the summer of 1977. In January 1978, a contin gent of approximately 250 fighters reportedly landed in Lebanon from Libya an were presumed to be made up, at least in part, of members of the Jibri organization. This increment might have been intended to shore up the PFLP-G whose numbers and prestige plummeted after its division.

Tactics/Methods of operation:

(U) Rocket attacks across the Lebanese border and raids on Israel and th occupied territories superseded earlier hijackings and aircraft sabotage. The PFLP-GC was involved in intramural Palestinian fighting in Lebanon and wa also implicated in attacks on French and pro-French United Nations troops.

Organization:

(S/NOFORN) The PFLP-GC has never been highly organized. Cohesion i maintained through operations and continuity is attributed to the personal authority of Jibril.

Headquarters/Bases:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The PFLP-GC has offices in Beirut, Tripoli (Lebanon), and Damascus. As of May 1977, Jibril had reoccupied the PFLP-GC's offices at the 'Ayn al Hilwah refugee camp in Lebanon and later fought to retain them. The PFLP-GC has camps and training facilities in Syria. Fighting between the PFLP-GC and FLP was primarily over control of bases in southern Lebanon; the outcome as it pertained to the bases was still unclear at the time of the Israeli invasion of the region in March 1978 which may have obviated some of the controversy.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In November 1974, an office was authorized in Tripoli, Libya. In 1977-78, the office was probably under Jibril's dominion. But in July 1978, Libya decided to merge offices of all Palestinian groups with the PLO office. The effect of this decision on the PFLP-GC operation has not been established. As noted, Jibril and Libyan leader Qadhafi do have a special relationship which may have served to preserve PFLP-GC's independence.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) In 1975, safehouses were acquired in Irbid and Amman, Jordan, for use in West Bank operations.

(C) The PFLP-GC may have established communications and supply centers in Eastern Europe. It is not known which faction retains control over these establishments.

Training:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Aside from regular commando training, some members received pilot training in Libya.

Weapons:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The PFLP-GC uses Soviet-made weapons usually obtained from or through Syria. During the war in Lebanon, the PFLP-GC was responsible for the receipt of Libyan weapons and equipment and their orderly distribution to various leftist groups.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The Command has factories in the Sayda region of Lebanon where it constructs or assembles RPG-7 antitank rockets and Kalashnikov rifles.

Finances:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Some remuneration is provided by Syria. In 1975, Libyan leader Qadhafi pledged $13 million for the PFLP-GC in the rejectionist cause. Libyan funding is presumably continuing, especially in view of PFLP-GC aid against Egypt.

International connections:

(U) Aside from weapons and financial support from Syria and Libya, Kuwaiti-based Palestinians and Syrian Army officers who know Jibril from his days in the service support his faction.

(S) The PFLP-GC has given assistance to the Turkish People's Liberation Army (TPLA) and the Turkish Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Party (TRWPP) and trained some of their members in its camps in Syria and/or Lebanon. The Command had monthly contacts with these groups. The status of relationships since the PFLP-GC split is unknown.

(U) In November 1975, members of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) graduated from a training course at a PFLP-GC camp in Syria.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) A London-situated, Libyan intelligence center is used to direct PFLP-GC procurement and shipment of funds and support operations. One PFLP-GC member is accredited as a Libyan diplomat in London.

Event analysis:

(U) Aside from the 1968-69 hijackings, the PFLP-GC has not been responsible for any blatant international terrorism. Duplication of the devastating anti-Israel exploit at Qiryat Shemona is undoubtedly an organizational goal, much as the DFLP endeavors to repeat Ma'alot; but no comparable attempts have been undertaken. The 1975 kidnaping of a US Army colonel appears to have been an act of opportunity not a conspiracy. Moreover, since the 1976 split, the PFLP-GC operational competence has not been tested and may be doubted.

Significant activities:

(U) No pattern of operations can be discerned from the diverse PFLP-GC actions described below. (all entries - (U)):

July 1968 - Hijacked an El Al airliner en route from Rome to Tel Aviv and ordered it flown to Algiers. The terrorists demanded the release of 1,000 Palestinians imprisoned in Israel. All but 21 hostages were released almost immediately. Five days later, nine more hostages were released. Five weeks later, Algeria freed the remaining 12 hostages. In return, Israel promised to make a "humanitarian" gesture and subsequently announced that it would release 16 convicted Arab infiltrators captured before the 1967 War.

February 1969 - Machinegunned an El Al airliner as it was about to take off from Zurich for Tel Aviv.

August 1969 - Hijacked a TWA airliner en route to Athens and Tel Aviv and forced it to land in Damascus where the passengers were evacuated and the

plane was blown up by a timebomb. Two terrorists held 113 hostages and stated that their action was to protest a US sale of Phantom jets to Israel. All but six hostages were released by the Syrian Government, which detained the six and the terrorists for some time before freeing them.

April 1974 - Raided the village of Qiryat Shemona, Israel. Three terrorists, armed with rifles, explosives, and handgrenades, infiltrated from Lebanon in the early morning hours. After spraying gunfire indiscriminately in the streets, they stormed an apartment building, killing 18 and wounding 16. PFLP-GC statements from Beirut and Damascus demanded the release of 100 Palestinians from Israeli prisons in exchange for hostages it claimed were being held by the terrorists in Qiryat Shemona. Israeli troops engaged the terrorists in a 4-hour gunbattle. The terrorists probably died by blowing themselves up with their own grenades. Two members of the assault force were killed in the fighting.

June-July 1975 - Kidnaped a US Army colonel in Beirut, in collaboration with the Popular Struggle Front (PSF). Calling itself the Revolutionary Socialist Action Organization, the terrorist group threatened to kill the colonel unless relief was distributed in a Beirut slum. Several deadlines passed before two 20-ton loads of supplies were delivered to the designated area. The Lebanese Government said it had supplied the food as part of a general relief effort. On the following day, the colonel was brought to a secret rendezvous in a suburb where he was met by a Muslim religious leader and then driven to the home of the Prime Minister and released. Both the PLO and the Syrian Government had used their influence with the PFLP-GC to bring about the release. In all, the colonel was held for 3 weeks.

Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP)

Executive Summary

(U) Completely rejectionist, the FLP does not accept the limited goal of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Formed by 100 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) dissidents, many FLP positions and actions seem to be reactions to PFLP-GC character and history. It is vehemently anti-Syria, which supports the General Command, and has strong ties to and obtains weapons and training from Iraq. The FLP's collegial or alternating leadership plan may be a response to Ahmad Jibril's domination of the PFLP-GC.

(C) The FLP's only attempted terrorist operation thus far, intended to repeat the PFLP-GC's "successful" hostage-taking massacre of 1974, was unsuccessful. Yet, the group is believed to have the potential and capabilities to perpetrate successful actions.

Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP)

ientation/Goals:

(U) The FLP is completely rejectionist and opposes the Palestine ational program amenable to a limited Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip. It is vehemently anti-Syria because of that ation's anti-Palestinian actions during the war in Lebanon and subsequent upport for the rival PFLP-GC. PLO spokesmen have claimed that FLP acts under raqi orders. While this claim may be questioned, the FLP does have very trong ties to Iraq and agrees with its policies. The FLP opposes all facets f the Sadat peace initiative.

stimated strength:

(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL) 100.

rincipal leaders:

(U) Talaat Tawfiq (aka Talaat Yaqub)

(U) Presumably FLP secretary general, Tawfiq signed the Tripoli Steadfastness Summit declarations for the group.

(U) Muhammad al Abbas (Abu Abbas)

(U) Formerly second in command of the PFLP-GC, Abu Abbas led the faction pposed to Ahmad Jibril's support for the Syrian incursion into Lebanon and is ow assistant seretary general of the FLP. He was admitted to the January 1979 Palestine National Council session as an individual, not as FLP representative, pending future PLO decisions on organizational recognition.

(U) Always a militant, Abu Abbas' name had been linked with the PFLP-GC idnaping of a US Army colonel in 1975.

ackground:

(U) Abu Abbas and a large group of PFLP-GC members stridently opposed hmad Jibril's support for the Syrian incursion into Lebanon in June 1976. By eptember 1976, they attempted to expel him for collaborating against the alestine resistance movement and apparently obtained control over the PFLP-C. As steps were being taken to implement a cease-fire in Lebanon and put a joint Arab imprimatur on Syrian actions there, As-Sa'iqa and Syrian Army forces attempted to reestablish Jibril's control over his group and suppress the Abu Abbas wing. Abu Abbas and his rejectionist allies fought these efforts. In April 1977, Yasir Arafat arranged an official division of the

group into the PFLP-GC and the FLP. Conflicts continued because Jibril persisted in his anti-Abu Abbas campaign and because of FLP/rejectionist opposition to As-Sa'iqa and Syria.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) An uncertain peace between the parties emerged in the summer of 1977 when Abu Abbas reconciled with some Sa'iqa leaders.

(U) Continuing appeasement may be a byproduct of the Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement. Nonetheless, battles for control of sites and facilities were waged intermittently through September 1978. At that time, fighting occurred over a naval position north of Tyre.

(U) In 1978, differences over policies in south Lebanon and toward the United Nations forces put the FLP at odds with Arafat and Fatah. The PLO leader was determined to foster moderation in the south and prevent undue harassment of UNIFIL. In July, the FLP kidnaped a large number of UNIFIL soldiers in Tyre; Fatah forced their release. The ensuing battles between the two groups were among the bloodiest ever waged among Palestinians. The Fatah FLP confrontation may be considered part of the general Fatah-Iraq feud and an outcome of Fatah's decision to suppress Iraqi-sponsored groups which perpetrate irresponsible acts.

(U) On 13 August 1978, the FLP lost approximately 75 fighters in a devastating explosion that leveled a building housing its military command in the Fakhani section of Beirut. The explosion ushered in a short period of bilateral discussions and peacemaking among various Palestinian factions. In November 1978, however, a new round of clashes, this time triggered by FLP disapproval of the Fatah-initiated dialog with King Hussein of Jordan, resulted in one FLP member killed, four wounded and 16 captured.

(U) The cycle shifted back toward appeasement in time for the January 1979 session of the Palestine National Council. There, the FLP expressed a willingness to accept some increment in Fatah representation of the Executive Committee in order to get itself and other rejectionists admitted to the forum. Its compromise, however, still failed to meet Fatah's own criteria for compensatory membership based on strength. The FLP, therefore, is still excluded from the EC.

Tactics/Methods of operation:

(U) Although it may have the capability to do so, the FLP has not undertaken any successful terrorist operations against Israel yet. The September 1978 attempt to duplicate the dramatic 1974 PFLP-GC hostage-taking operation at Qiryat Shemona may be indicative of future methods of operation.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The FLP was responsible for widespread pillaging and other incendiary actions in Lebanon.

Organization:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In late January 1978, the general command of the FLP decided to rotate the office of secretary general among four individuals, including Talaat Tawfiq and Muhammad al Abbas, for terms of 6 months each. The leader, therefore, is considered first among equals and not overwhelmingly powerful. Despite this decision, Tawfiq's is the only name continuously mentioned as secretary general with Abu Abbas as assistant.

Headquarters/Bases:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The FLP has joint offices with the PFLP in Baghdad. The Abu Gharib camp in Janayit Zuwwar, west of Baghdad is at the disposal of Abu Abbas followers.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Before the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in March 1978, the FLP may have controlled some former PFLP-GC facilities in that region. Their current status is unknown.

(C/NOFORN) The FLP may have an installation near the Sabra refugee camp in Lebanon.

Training:

(U) Information not available; probably in Iraq.

Weapons:

(U) The FLP used heavy weapons against the PFLP-GC, As-Sa'iqa and Syrian troops. These were probably provided by Iraqi forces then in Lebanon. It also has small arms and handgrenades for use in terrorist missions.

Finances:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) During the war in Lebanon, the Abu Abbas group had control of the Beirut banking district and obtained an estimated $16 million from several banks.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The FLP is now aided financially by Libya and by the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut.

International connections:

(U) Aside from weapons and financial support mentioned, information is generally not available. Presumably, the FLP retained access to some PFLP-GC international ties.

Event analysis:

(U) No really applicable yet because the FLP has not carried out any successful operations and any potential for international action has not been realized.

Significant activities:

July 1978 - (U) Kidnaped 51 UNIFIL soldiers in Tyre; forced by Fatah to release them several hours later.

September 1978 - (C) Three terrorists, armed with automatic weapons and handgrenades, infiltrated northern Israel and allegedly planned to take over the Qiryat Shemona municipality and hold employees hostage for the release of ten imprisoned comrades. Two were intercepted by an Israeli Army patrol and surrendered peacefully. The third was captured after an extensive manhunt.

Arab Liberation Front (ALF)

Executive Summary

(U) Created by and serving Iraq's interests in the Palestinian resistance movement, the ALF is rejectionist. Its policies, however, do waver in congruence with Iraqi positions because it is tied in some indistinct way to the Iraqi Ba'th Party.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The 100 to 300 members are trained by the Iraqi Army and by Palestine Liberation Army 'Ayn Jallut Brigade instructors based in Iraq. Iraq provides weaponry, which includes rifles, machineguns, grenade launchers, artillery and rockets.

(U) Having carried out only one major hostage-taking incident--in Israel in 1975--the ALF has claimed credit for various bombings and other actions in Israel and the occupied territories; most claims are uncorroborated.

Arab Liberation Front (ALF)

Orientation/Goals:

(U) The ALF was created to serve Iraqi interests in the Palestine resistance movement and is controlled and maintained solely by the Iraqi Government. Imbued with Iraqi Ba'thism, the ALF is dedicated to a pan-Arab conception of the guerrilla struggle, contending that the liberation of Palestine is not the duty of Palestinians alone but of the entire Arab nation. Arabizing the Palestinian movement will insure that Palestine, when it emerges, will be part of the greater Arab nation, not another independent Arab state.

(U) The ALF is rejectionist. At the Palestine National Council session in March 1977, however, its delegates voted in favor of the moderate Palestine national program, declaring the goal of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This vote was a temporary aberration, perhaps due to Iraq's domestic situation, and the ALF returned to its totally intransigent orientation soon afterward. The ALF opposes all facets of the Sadat peace initiative.

Estimated strength:

(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL) 100-300.

Principle leader:

(U) Abd ar Rahim Ahmad (Abu Isma'il).

Background:

(U) The ALF was created by Iraq in 1969. In 1974, it "suspended" its membership on the PLO/Executive Committee when that body adopted a moderate working paper advocating the establishment of a Palestinian "entity" on limited territory, and joined the Rejection Front. After the March 1977 Palestine National Council session, the ALF agreed to resume participation in the PLO/EC. Its dual membership of both the EC and the Rejection Front is unique.

(U) During the war in Lebanon, ALF members were among the most obstinate activists, keeping the situation hot at the behest of the Iraqi Government and, after the June 1976 Syrian incursion, seeking direct Iraqi military involvement.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Formerly having about 100 Iraqi and Jordanian members, the ALF's ranks in Lebanon were inflated and aided by Iraqi troops, ex-Iraqi Army Ba'th Party of Iraq (BPI) members, newly trained Iraqi

civilians, and members of the Lebanese wing of the BPI. Toward the end of 1976, between 1,500 and 3,000 individuals "belonged" to the ALF. In January 1977, Iraqi forces were officially withdrawn from Lebanon and only a slight increase in ALF strength remained.

(U) Although the ALF reluctantly accepted the October 1976 cease-fire in Lebanon, it continued to participate in skirmishes with Syrian-dominated As-Sa'iqa and Arab Deterrent Force troops throughout 1977.

(C/NOFORN) After the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in March 1978, the ALF again adopted a hard line. It was among the first groups to attempt to reinfiltrate the south--in late April.

(U) As part of Fatah's attempt to impose moderation on the situation in the south and in relations with the United Nations, it clashed with various Iraqi-sponsored incendiary groups, including the ALF.

Tactics/Methods of operation:

(U) Primarily involved in fighting Iraq's battles in internecine Palestinian and intra-Arab disputes, the ALF has attacked Sa'iqa, the PFLP-GC, and Syrian forces in Lebanon more often than the Israelis. It has undertaken several commando raids into Israel and the occupied territories, most of which were unsuccessful, and has claimed responsibility for bombings and other operations which were never confirmed.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In March 1978, a new insight into ALF operations emerged. A member who had been residing in Qatar since 1969 was arrested and deported. He was presumed to be a "sleeper" awaiting activation by ALF/Iraqi decisionmakers. Thus, the ALF may be involved in wider ranging subversion than was previously assumed.

Organization:

(U) The ALF organizational structure does not function without the approval or orders of the Iraqi regime; it may be part of or may answer to the Palestinian section of the Pan-Arab Command of the BPI. In late 1975, internal BPI changes resulted in the replacement of the ALF secretary general.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Until 1977, in Lebanon, the ALF may have been controlled by the Iraqi People's Army, the BPI's paramilitary force.

Headquarters/Bases:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Headquartered in Baghdad, with offices in the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut, the ALF has bases or camps at Jabal Mansur and Rashid in Iraq, and in the Wadi Abu al Aswad region of Lebanon, north of the Litani River, and training facilities in the Ad Damur area of Lebanon.

Training:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) Guerrilla warfare, small unit tactics, infiltration techniques, small arms and explosives use, hand-to-hand combat and physical conditioning are taught by Iraqi Army and Palestine Liberation Army 'Ayn Jallut Brigade instructors. Women affiliated with the ALF have been trained in close combat procedures in Lebanon.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The ALF member discovered in Qatar had attended several courses in the Soviet Union.

(U) A few years ago, media reports suggested that 200 Cubans were training the ALF in subversive tactics at the camps in Iraq.

Weapons:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The ALF has Kalashnikov rifles, machineguns, rockets, RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers, and a limited number of mortars, artillery, and 107-mm surface-to-surface rockets. Iraqi Army forces may have provided heavy weapons during the war in Lebanon.

Finances:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) ALF members residing in Iraq receive salaries, education allowances, housing and free automobiles. During the war in Lebanon, new recruits were given a $100 premium. Iraqi Army members of the ALF are paid their regular stipends. Women affiliates receive about $100 per month. The group as a whole receives a monthly subsidy.

International connections:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The ALF has been active in antiregime activity in Kuwait. Members there are members of the BPI, carry Iraqi passports, focus on and are active in student organizations. They have no separate office and try to blend into the community.

(C/NOFORN) In June 1973, the ALF was reported to have ties with the Arab student community in Perugia, Italy.

(U) Allegations concerning Cuban instructors were mentioned above.

Event analysis:

(U) The ALF's only dramatic operation, in 1975, was directed against Israeli civilians. It was not successful and has not been repeated.

Significant activities (all entries = (U)):

December 1974 - Carried out bombings at Hanita, Israel.

June 1975 - Perpetrated kidnapings at Kfar Yuval Kibbutz, Israel. Four terrorists, armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles and a grenade launcher, infiltrated from Lebanon, attacked the settlement, and held a family hostage. Two hours after their initial assault, they demanded the release of 12 prisoners, including Archbishop Capucci, from Israeli jails. Armed settlers and Israeli Defense Force soldiers surrounded the house in which the hostages were held and reinforcements arrived. A half hour after the demand was made, the IDF stormed the house accompanied by the head of the family who was killed. Three terrorists died immediately and one shortly thereafter. An Israeli woman died of wounds received. An IDF soldier on leave had been killed when he tried to bar the terrorists' way as the family scrambled for cover in the initial assault.

June 1977 - Attempted assassination of Syrian President Hafez Asad.

August 1977 - Unsuccessfully attempted to infiltrate civilian target near Ashdot Ya'acov, Israel.

Popular Struggle Front (PSF)

Executive Summary

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) A small, 200 to 300 member, mostly inactive rejectionist group, the PSF demands the liberation of all Palestinian territory and opposes the ministate concept. It has some rocket launchers and rockets and may be dependent on other Rejection Front organizations as well as on Iraq and Syria.

Popular Struggle Front (PSF)

Orientation/Goals:

(U) Rejectionist before the word became common usage, the PSF calls for armed struggle to liberate Palestine, eliminate Israel, and create a democratic, secular state in all of the former British Mandate territory. It steadfastly opposes the creation of a ministate on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Estimated strength:

(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL) 200 to 300.

Principal leader:

(U) Dr. Samir Ghawshah (Ghush).

(U) He is secretary general of the PSF and secretary of the Rejection Front.

Background:

(U) A veteran Palestinian activist, Bahjat abu Gharbiyah, founded the PSF in July 1967 in cooperation with Major Fayez Hamdan of the Palestine Liberation Army. (Hamdan was killed in an Israeli air raid on As Salt in Jordan in 1968.) Abu Gharbiyah had struggled against both the British and the Israelis in Hebron in 1948 and had been a member of the first PLO leadership after 1964. He stayed on the PLO/EC after Arafat assumed control in 1969. Because of ill health and disapproval of the way Palestinian goals were being pursued, Abu Gharbiyah suspended PSF activities and participation on the EC after the Jordanian suppression of 1970. After the October 1973 War, the PSF was revived.

(U) In 1974, Abu Gharbiyah retired from active life. He was succeeded by Ghawshah who advocates closer cooperation with various guerrilla and leftist movements and brought the PSF into the Rejection Front.

Tactics/Methods of operation:

(U) The PSF has undertaken several cross-border operations into Israel and the occupied territories and claimed responsibility for many others which were never confirmed. The 1975 kidnaping of a US Army officer appears to have been accomplished by chance and not premeditation or sophisticated planning.

Organization:

(U) Information not available.

Headquarters/Bases:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The PSF is headquartered in the Tariq al Jadida area of Beirut and is based almost entirely in Lebanon.

(U) Before the war in Lebanon, PSF announcements were made from Damascus. Cells have been uncovered in East Jerusalem.

Training:

(U) Information not available.

Weapons:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) As of January 1977, the PSF command post in Beirut had 60-mm and 81-mm rocket launchers, rockets, rifle-propelled grenades, and BS-7 antitank rockets.

Finances:

(U) Funds are donated by Iraq and Libya.

International connections:

(U) Information not available.

Event analysis:

(U) Not applicable.

Significant activities (all entries = (U)):

May 1975 - Bombed Ein Fesh'ha, an Israeli resort.

June-July 1975 - Kidnaped a US Army colonel in Beirut and turned him over to the PFLP-GC. (Details under PFLP-GC).

Black June Organization (BJO)

Executive Summary

(U) Intransigently rejectionist, the BJO demands that all Arab and Palestinian efforts be directed at armed struggle against the Zionist enemy and calls for the destruction of "reactionary" Arab regimes and the removal of moderate Palestine Liberation Organization leaders. Formed originally by Fatah dissidents (and now having about 500 members), the BJO is harshly critical of the current Fatah leadership because of its lack of revolutionary zeal and pursuit of armed struggle.

(U) Having perpetrated only one international terrorist incident, a hijacking in 1974, the BJO became a tool of Iraq's surrogate warfare against moderate Arabs and Palestinians, attacking Syrian diplomats and embassies, and assassinating PLO officials. With the post-Camp David Iraqi-Syrian-Palestinian reconciliation, the BJO heyday may be over.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Iraq provided a special hijacking course, other training, and all weapons. BJO terrorist materiel was very sophisticated, including sniper rifles with infrared night-vision scopes and plastic bags which hide weapons and foil X-ray scanners. Although organizational information is limited, operatives have been known to work in small cells or teams. The BJO also deployed a vituperative propaganda weapon.

Black June Organization (BJO) - (aka Fatah - The Revolutionary Council)

Organization/Goals:

(U) Instransigently rejectionist, the BJO opposes all efforts taken toward political reconciliation of the Middle East confict and believes armed struggle against the Zionist enemy should be the first priority of the Palestine resistance movement. Simultaneously, it calls for the destruction of ruling "reactionary" regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf shaykhdoms and is critical of the PLO's overall moderation and lack of revolutionary base and zeal. Consequently, the BJO contends that both inter-Arab and intra-Palestinian terrorism are needed to precipitate an all-embracing Arab revolution which, alone, can lead to the liberation of Palestine.

(U) A pliant tool of Iraq's surrogate warfare against moderate Arabs and Palestinians, the BJO is linked to the Ba'th Party of Iraq and the Iraqi intelligence network and to those institutions' policy priorities.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) With roots in Fatah, the BJO's adversary relationship with the dominant fedayeen group is crucial. The BJO argues that the current Fatah leadership is illegal because no Central Committee elections have been held since 1971. Moreover, since Arafat opposes armed struggle and, therefore, has betrayed the cause, he must die. The BJO use of the name Fatah - the Revolutionary Council in broadcasts states its ties to Fatah, its intent to radicalize Fatah, and its difference from the parent group's moderation. Because of the inclusion of the illegal Fatah leaders in the PLO, the BJO maintains that the umbrella is also illegal.

Estimated strength:

(U) 500 (?)

Principle leader:

(U) Sabri Khalil al Banna (Abu Nidal). Born 1938 in Jaffa.

(U) Al Banna's family fled to Jordan in 1948; he later received a degree in England. In the early 1960's, he joined Al Fatah in Jordan, adopted the nom de guerre Abu Nidal,and eventually rose in rank to become a member of the group's parliament, the Revolutionary Council. Although reportedly active in Jihaz al Rasd, Fatah intelligence, it is not known if Abu Nidal was ever involved in the Black September Organization, believed to have been created by Rasd. After the suppression of the Palestinian movement in Jordan in 1970, he increasingly advocated a radical line, calling for the use of terrorism against Arab and foreign targets. Exactly when he split from Fatah is unknown; at the time, he was Fatah representative in Baghdad.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) After the Palestine National Council adopted a relatively moderate program in June 1974, Abu Nidal's views developed a following among opponents to the program and a separate group coalesced around his leadership. In October 1974, a Fatah revolutionary court sentenced Abu Nidal to death in absentia for trying to incite armed insurrection in the organization and planning to assassinate senior Fatah officials. To public knowledge, Abu Nidal has not left his headquarters outside Baghdad since being sentenced.

(U) In July 1978, the PLO addressed a memorandum to the Iraqi regime demanding it hand over Abu Nidal for trial and put an end to his operations. Iraq did not agree to the demand and the Fatah-Iraq/BJO feud continued throughout the summer. Following mediation by the Algerian Ambassador to Beirut, Fatah and Iraq reconciled and Abu Nidal declared that, to avoid fratricide, he would end reprisals if Fatah reciprocated. The BJO has since been inactive. In December 1978, a Kuwaiti newspaper reported that Al Banna had relinquished his leadership of the BJO as a result of the Fatah-Iraq reconciliation and because of ill health; the report has not been confirmed.

Background:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) In the summer of 1974, after the Palestine National Council adopted a moderate program, young Fatah dissidents, some from Al Asifah (Fatah's commando arm), who opposed Arafat's leadership and measures toward a peaceful settlement, were attracted by the more radical Abu Nidal. In September 1974, followers of the assassinated renegade Ahmad al Ghaffur also joined Al Banna. Units from the Palestine Liberation Army Qadisiyah Brigade, usually based in Iraq, added to BJO strength in 1976.

(U) After being identified with Al Banna's name for several years, the group adopted the name Black June to commemorate and deplore the June 1976 Syrian intervention in the war in Lebanon on the side of the Christian right against the Muslim left and its Palestinian allies.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In February 1977, the Ba'th Party of Iraq National Command Political Office reportedly warned BJO leaders in Baghdad not to carry out any terrorist operations in Jordan or Syria without the knowledge of Iraqi intelligence offices. BJO was inactive for most of 1977, perhaps due to Iraqi policy dictates.

(U) Nonetheless, Abu Nidal's following grew and BJO operations against Palestinian moderates and moderation escalated in 1978. In April, 130 guerrillas were arrested with Fatah leader Muhammad Da'ud Awdah (Abu Da'ud) who was preparing to disobey Arafat's orders and launch operations behind Israeli lines in southern Lebanon. They reportedly had been sent by Abu Nidal, seeking to strengthen Fatah leftists and enable them to wrest control of Fatah from Arafat. In the first 6 months of 1978, BJO assassinated three prominent

PLO moderates, all allies of Arafat, BJO was a primary contributor to the Fatah-Iraq terror which continued into August 1978. In July 1978, Fatah militiamen stormed BJO offices in Tripoli, Libya. In the fall, the Fatah-Iraq rapprochement and the publication of the Camp David frameworks for peace were succeeded by a general Iraq/Syria/PLO understanding. This development had a great impact on BJO operations; they ceased. Once again, therefore, the group is experiencing a pause in activity dictated by Iraqi policies.

Tactics/Methods of operations:

(U) The BJO carried out one hijacking in 1974. Abu Nidal claimed that his group ceased these operations because they were "too individual" and not useful. Instead, the group undertook major assaults on Syrian, Jordanian and PLO diplomatic representations and assassinations of Palestinian and Arab officials. After 1976, the BJO specialized in pan-Arab, pan-Palestinian terrorism and did not direct any operations against Israel, the enemy.

(S) In early 1978, the BJO published a list of PLO officials it intended to assassinate and a warning to other Palestinian leaders against actions or statements favoring negotiations. These criteria determined its targets.

Organization:

(U) Usually operating in teams of four or five terrorists for larger missions, assassinations were carried out by one or two BJO killers.

Headquarters/Bases:

(U) The BJO is an entirely underground organization.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Headquartered in Baghdad, the group has camps and training facilities in Habbaniyah, near Ramadi, and near Hit, Iraq, and an office in Kuwait.

(U) Uncorroborated Egyptian sources suggested that the BJO has offices in Beirut, Algiers, and Aden and planned to expand the network to Amman, Damascus, Casablanca, Rome, London, Paris, Belgrade, Geneva and Bonn.

(U) After being attacked by Fatah, a BJO office in Tripoli was closed by Libyan authorities in July 1978.

(U) Abu Nidal has a stronger following among Palestinians in Britain than in any other European country.

Training:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) A 45-day training cycle teaches use of small arms, mines and explosives as well as political indoctrination. A special course had been offered in hijacking during which Japanese, German, Cuban, and Arab instructors lectured on tradecraft, aircraft construction and procedures and airline security agreements.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Some BJO followers were trained by or in Pakistan.

Weapons:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Iraq and Libya are primary arms suppliers. The BJO inventory includes Tokarev-type pistols, submachineguns, grenades and sniper rifles with infrared night vision scopes. Iraq provides Soviet-made plastic bags to hide weapons and foil X-ray scanners. Antitank weapons and light artillery are also in the arsenal.

(C) In 1978, Qadisiyah Brigade members reportedly learned how to make homemade bombs from material available at pharmacies, grocery or hardware stores. Chemical fertilizer, paint powder, aluminum powder, high octane gas, cotton balls, nitric acids and pure spirit are among the ingredients used in the manufacture of high explosives or incendiary devices. Camera batteries and flash bulbs serve as detonators, wrist watches as timers and primers and fuses are improvised.

(U) A BJO assassin carried a .32-caliber automatic handgun.

(U) False travel documents are plentiful.

(U) Before the Iraq-PLO accord, the BJO deployed an exceptionally strong propaganda weapon. Its radio station broadcasted slander from Baghdad and its news agency's articles attacked PLO rightists on the front pages of Iraq's state-controlled newspapers. This activity may now be nonexistent.

Finances:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Members receive 100 Iraqi dinars (US$330) a month plus family supplements and casualty benefits.

(U) The PLO claims that Iraq grants Palestinian students scholarships to study in Europe in exchange for serving Abu Nidal and Iraqi intelligence.

(U) The Egyptians add Libya as a donor to the BJO.

International connections:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) BJO emissaries are sent to Palestinian communities in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Weapons were stockpiled in Kuwait where the BJO has strong ties to Palestinian students. The BJO also exerts considerable influence among Palestinian students studying in Pakistan. These students receive liberal Iraqi financial aid and transit via Baghdad, where they are recruited by the BJO, to get to Pakistan.

(U) Ties to students in other countries and the alleged BJO international network were mentioned in other sections.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Iraqi and Libyan aid is augmented in an unspecified way by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

(C) In November 1976, two Italian terrorists were arrested at the West German-Netherlands border. They carried the names of BJO operatives who had been taken into custody in connection with the October 1976 assault on the Syrian Embassy in Rome. It was suggested that the Italians, affiliation unknown, had planned to liberate the Palestinians.

(U) In April 1978, Egyptian authorities broke up an alleged international terrorists organization called Al Khal as Sahih Lifatah (The Correct Course of Fatah). According to the Egyptians, the group was part of the BJO and planned to carry out sabotage and assassinations to disrupt the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. Palestinian and Jordanian students resident in Egypt made up most of the group and were linked to Swiss anarchists and West Germans.

(U) At the time of the kidnaping and murder of Italian politician Aldo Moro, the media seemed to mix fact and speculation inextricably and liberally. One allegation tying the BJO to the Red Brigades and the current generation of the Baader-Meinhof Group/Red Army Faction may have some credibility.

(U) The Egyptians allege that Abu Nidal met with the international terrorist Carlos (Il'ich Ramirez Sanchez) shortly before the assassination of Yusuf as Siba'i. While not corroborated, the meeting was possible because of Carlos' ties to the Haddad faction of the PFLP which was based in Baghdad.

Event analysis:

(U) No explicit political demands were made during the BJO's only hijacking operation. The terrorists merely sought the release of imprisoned comrades, whose number and the number of countries in which they were held escalated as the incident's duration extended. The hijacking and subsequent hostage-taking incident in Syria were the work of 4-man teams. Assassinations usually worked along or with a single partner. Since 1976, all BJO actions have been aimed only at moderate Arabs and Palestinians.

Significant activities:

November 1974 - (S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Hijacked a BOAC plane from Dubai to Tunis. Four terrorists, armed with machineguns, handgrenades, and pistols, and dressed as mechanics, breached the security fence at Dubai International Airport and stormed on board the aircraft. Two people were wounded during the takeover. The plane took off with about 47 hostages and headed westward, refueling in Tripoli, Libya, and proceeding to Tunis. At first, the purpose of the hijacking was unclear. Then the Tunisian Minister of Interior was informed that the passengers and crew would be released in exchange for eight terrorists being held in Egypt for the March 1973 murders of the US Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission in Sudan, plus five saboteurs jailed in Rome for the firebombing of a US plane in December 1973. The hijackers demanded permission to fly to the destination of their choice and threatened to shoot hostages one by one after a set deadline passed and until their demands were met. The Egyptian Government refused to negotiate. Salah Khalaf, a Fatah/BSO leader, went to Tunis to represent the PLO in dealing with the terrorists. When he showed up alone, without the requested prisoners, the terrorists shot a West German passenger and threw his body out of the plane. During the wait for the Rome prisoners, 12 female hostages were released. A demand that the Dutch Government release two prisoners jailed for a 1973 hijacking of another British plane was added. The Dutch complied on the fourth day of the incident. The hijackers then released all except three crew member and threatened to blow up the plane unless the Tunisian Government granted them asylum. Assured that they would not be turned over to the PLO, the terrorists left the plane. Two weeks later, the Tunisian authorities announced that the four hijackers and their seven released comrades had been freed and had left Tunisia.

September 1976 - (U) Seized a luxury hotel in Damascus, taking 90 hostages. Four terrorists, armed with machineguns and grenades, demanded the release of 35 prisoners (presumably Palestinians) from Syrian jails and issued a general protest against Syrian military actions in Lebanon. At least 300 Syrian Army Special Forces members surrounded the hotel soon after the terrorists entered it; about 50 troops were ordered to storm the hotel. A 3-hour gunbattle ensued. One terrorist was killed and three were captured; four hostages were killed and 34 wounded. Several members of the assault squad were wounded.

October 1976 - (U) Assaulted Syrian Embassies in Rome and Islamabad on the same day.

November 1976 - (U) Assaulted Intercontinental Hotel, Amman.

December 1976 - (U) Attempted assassination of Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam.

October 1977 - (U) Claimed responsibility for killing United Arab Emirates Minister of Foreign Affairs in another unsuccessful attempt on the life of Khaddam.

January 1978 - (U) Assassinated Sa'id Hammami, PLO representative in London. A terrorist, who apparently had an appointment with the Palestinian diplomat, shot Hammami three times with an automatic handgun.

February 1978 - (U) Assassinated Yusuf as Siba'i, secretary general of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), editor of Al Ahram and friend of Sadat, in Nicosia, and commandeered an airplane. Two gunmen entered the lobby of the hotel where the AAPSO presidium was meeting and killed Siba'i. The terrorists then forced their way into the meeting hall and took about 30 hostages, mostly conference delegates. Barricading themselves in a coffee shop, they negotiated the exchange of some hostages for a Cyprus Airways Plane and safe passage out of the country. The plane took off with 11 hostages and a volunteer crew, but Libya, Kuwait, Somalia, Ethiopia and South Yemen refused permission to land. Only Djibouti allowed refueling. Returning to Cyprus, negotiations continued at Larnaca Airport between the terrorists still on the plane and high Cypriot Government officials. Apparently the culprits agreed to release the remaining hostages in exchange for passports and safe conduct. Before this final step could be taken, however, a chaotic, unauthorized, Egyptian counterterror assault was launched and opposed by the Cypriots. In the end, 15 Egyptian soldiers were killed and 16 wounded; six Cypriot National Guardsmen and policemen and one Cyprus Airways employee were wounded, and an Egyptian C-130 transport plane was destroyed. The terrorists surrendered to the Cypriot Government and are still in custody.

June 1978 - (U) Assassinated 'Ali Nasir Yasin, PLO representative Kuwait.

August 1978 - (U) Assassinated Izz ad Din Khalaq, PLO representative in Paris. Two terrorists entered the Arab League building, made their way to the PLO office, pulled out guns and ordered people in the waiting room to a side office. They then entered Khalaq's office and sprayed him with bullets. As they left, the murderers threw a grenade which exploded, killing Khalaq's deputy and injuring others.

- (U) Assaulted PLO offices in Islamabad, Pakistan. Four terrorists, armed with submachineguns and grenades, broke into the PLO office and murdered a radio operator, two Palestinian students and a Pakistani police guard. The gunmen escaped.